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THE FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
by Harvey Wheeler*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE MYSTIQUE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
During the 1970's the principles of constitutionalism attracted
renewed attention as a result of the constitutional crisis that came to
a head during the Nixon Administration. Reform proposals varied
from the nationalization of the party system to devices for revitalizing
the checks and balances mechanism that had ceased to function as
planned by its 18th century designers. The proposal most frequently
offered was to limit the power of the presidency and enhance that of
Congress. But all such proposals make the implicit assumption that the
18th century constitutionalizing impulse that produced our tripartite
system of checked and balanced governmental functions embodies the
enduring essence of constitutionalism. But even if one grants the
initial adequacy for America of the checks and balances system, it never
worked well elsewhere. What if it should turn out that our original
checks and balances system was appropriate only under special histori-
cal and social conditions? The contemporary need to revitalize consti-
tutionalism would then dictate quite different reforms.
This essay argues that the theory of constitutionalism, as revealed
through its anthropological and historical origins, proves that our origi-
nal checks and balances system was appropriate only under special
historical and social conditions. Specifically, the principles that under-
lay the provisions adopted by the designers of our Constitution were
essentially those that they had inherited from 17th century England;
the particular institutional arrangements that they devised resulted
from their efforts to decolonize and republicanize England's "Glorious"
Whig revolution. That their ingenious institutional devices are no
longer adequate today should come as no surprise. But the proof for
this statement is not, as with some propositions, intuitively self-evident.
In part, this is because the very idea of constitutionalism is somewhat
mysterious. Some of the responsibility for this can be attributed to the
obscurity with which the topic has been treated by those who have writ-
* B.A., M.A., Indiana University; Ph.D. Harvard University; Fellow, Institute for
Higher Studies. Author of The Conservative Crisis (1958); Democracy in a Revolu-
tionary Era (1968); and The Politics of Revolution (1971); coauthor, with Eugene Bur-
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ten about it. But it is also due to the fact that there is something
mysterious about its ingredients: law and government-government
because it furnishes a practical exemplification of the philosophic
proposition that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts; law be-
cause its effort, and sometimes its result, is to bring social order and
political stability out of chaos.
But constitutionalism stands for an even greater mystery. It purports
to guarantee that these attributes of law and government will be
achieved in accordance with the "rule of law," that it will be directed
to the realization of the common good, and that all this is to be accom-
plished through collective efforts of ordinary people, even though as
individuals they might act only from selfish and private motives. In
short, the mystique of constitutionalism holds that democracy and the
rule of law-the former derived from the institutionalization of medi-
eval civil disobedience-can be made supreme through a special com-
bination of electoral and governmental institutions. Drafting a constitu-
tion was the art of achieving these twin aims. The 18th century exposi-
tors of constitutionalism tended to convey the impression that constitu-
tion-making was a branch of science, not unlike Newtonian celestial
mechanics, and that if one utilized the proper structural principles in
making a constitution, the result would, almost automatically, produce
freedom and justice.' This was the political counterpart of the self-
regulating mechanism that was then thought to govern the price system
in free markets, even if people abandoned themselves to private vices.
So ran the constitutional mystique that inhered in the special 18th cen-
tury institutional devices designed to harness intrinsic human power
drives to the democratic production of the public good.
In recent times constitutionalism appears to have lost these myste-
rious self-regulative powers, and the family of its adherents has suffered
a grievous decline. As the number of constitutional democracies
diminished, the departing members seemed to abandon it roughly in
the order of their initial adoption. France virtually discarded consti-
tutional democracy under De Gaulle. Italy was close behind. Only
a few of Britain's imperial progeny remain among the faithful, and even
with them the picture is spotty. South Africa has had a quasi-fascist
regime for some time. Pakistan has a dictatorship. India is a doubt-
ful member of the family. The prospects for the two Irelands are not
bright. Only Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States
1. A. LovEjoy, The Theory of Human Nature in the American Constitution and the
Method of Counterpoise, in RFLECTIONS ON HuMAN NATuRE 35 (1961).
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seem steadfast, and even for this latter group, as with Britain herself,
the situation is becoming ever more precarious.
Outside the English speaking world there are West Germany and the
European marcher states, such as Switzerland, Holland, and Belgium.
Beyond these lie Scandinavia and possibly Israel, but there the situation
is something like that of India. On the periphery are Japan, Tanzania
and a scattering of others such as Malta, followed by a few potential
converts like Yugoslavia and Mexico. This list is not exhaustive, but
it does give an idea of the range of the various regimes that can still
in some way be associated with constitutional democracy. The list is
also instructive, for a rapid perusal suffices to underscore the perilous
position constitutional democracy now occupies in the world.
While the low point does not yet appear to have been reached, the
zenith can be located during the 1920's in the democratic reconstruc-
tion period that followed World War I. That was also the finest hour
for the political philosophy of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism was
then thought of as the structural theory scholars abstracted from the
working principles of the most effective of the constitutional democra-
cies then existing.
The American political tradition has always been characterized by
a predilection for discussions of the nature of constitutionalism, though
there was never solid agreement about just what constitutionalism
meant. However, in spite of this uncertainty, Americans have always
in the past been certain that regardless of what constitutionalism meant,
they possessed it. Indeed, the institutional genius Americans have ha-
bitually attributed to their own political tradition has even led them to
assume that constitutionalism is the exclusive property of the Anglo-
American nations; or alternatively, that constitutionalism may be simply
whatever the Anglo-American political systems happen to be at any
given time. As crisis has spread through democracies all over the
world, the search into the essential nature of constitutionalism has been
resumed with a special intensity. Following Watergate, and the close
brush with dictatorship it revealed, however, there is no basis for over-
confidence about the chances of its preservation.
Ancient constitutionalism dealt with an all embracing state. Modern
constitutionalism, however, from its birth in the 17th century, had been
associated with limited government. This was so, said Charles H.
McIlwain, "by definition."' It was usually concluded, during the 18th
2. C. McTLwAN, THE IGH COURT OF PA LuAmNT AND rrs SurPBMAcy 372-73
(1910) [hereinafter cited as McILwAI].
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and 19th centuries, that limited government required keeping govern-
ment small and inactive. If that were the case, the new type of posi-
tive government that succeeded the great depression was incompatible
with the principles of constitutionalism. The leading critics of positive
government, such as Albert Venn Dicey3 and Frederick Hayek,4
claimed that it and constitutional government were contradictions in
terms. As we shall see later the great constitutional debates of modern
times were waged over this issue.
Constitutionalism also had to accommodate the changed view of the
human being that began to emerge in the late 19th century as individu-
alistic rationalism lost credibility. People were no longer thought of
as the atomistic political agents our traditional constitutional morality
had assumed. Immersed in identifying groups and doubtful of per-
sonal capacity of political potency, the contemporary person finds the
credibility of individualistic rationalism undermined, but nonetheless
demands that constitutionalism continue to guarantee the individual po-
litical values that were associated with the former inner-directed status.
The component groups that are indigenous to contemporary society
are qualitatively different from the social groups prevalent in 1789.
The conditions of political activity have almost reversed themselves
from the time of James Madison, when the politically significant com-
ponents of the nation were the states. Virginia and Massachusetts were
prime examples. They were territorially, socially and economically au-
tonomous. Possessed of such coherence, they produced, on the
national level, "factions" whose members were convinced that the
values they saw confirmed in their own regional environments should
be generalized for all of society.
Early America's state-born factions were not single-purpose pressure
groups occupying a restricted segment of society, such as we now think
of when we consider contemporary political forces such as unions and
corporations. Rather, they were a series of general purpose units.
The two most powerful ones were the nascent manufacturing society
of the north and the southern planter society. Each made exclusive
bids for total power. Under such conditions the problem of politics,
as James Madison saw, was first to enlarge the size of the polity to en-
compass the entire nation and then politically dissociate their indig-
3. A. DICay, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAw OF THE CONsTIrUnON
(1889) [hereinafter cited as DiCmy].
4. F. HAYEK, THE CONSTiTUTION oF LmERTY (1960); F. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND
ECONOMIC ORDER (1944).
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enous components through a system of atomizing representative devices
which, after breaking through the homogeniety of the individual states,
might facilitate the achievement of general society-wide decisions in
Congress.
Our times face a different problem. It is to devise a politics for a
society that has witnessed the disintegration of the wholistic territorial
groupings that worried Madison. First came the development of
groupings such as unions, corporations and professions, and then fol-
lowed their informal amalgamation into a techno-organizational Estab-
lishment. The component parts can see no further than the politics
of self-interest; an informal amalgam-Dwight Eisenhower christened
it the military-industrial complex-that sees politics as the struggle for
power and control. To have claimed in the late 19th century that what
was good for Virginia was good for the nation might have been untrue,
but it was plausible. To claim in the mid-20th century that what is
good for General Motors is good for the nation is patently false.
The conceptions associated with constitutionalism have remained
constant, but their referents have shifted to such an extent that the old
constitutionalizing techniques no longer suffice. Politics is eternally
concerned with the achievement of unity from diversity, but the com-
ponents are now qualitatively different from those of the 18th century
and the forces of disunity much more noxious. Nineteenth century
German sociologists foresaw something like what has happened in
America when they described the transition from organizations based
upon natural communities to those based upon legal association.5 Un-
der such conditions constitutionalism must also change. Madison's
theory that salvation lies in the numerousness of "factions" is no longer
applicable. On the contrary, we are progressively persuaded that
rather it is our destruction that is implied by the growth of our modem
indigenous techno-organizational associations. One problem facing
20th century constitutionalism is to adjust its aims to cope with a society
in which the individual has little political significance except as the
member of a monstrous techno-organizational group; a society which
in the process of pressing its characteristic drive for power and control
upon its members has left them desensitized with regard to the com-
mon aims and general interests that a proper constitutional order ought
to elicit from its citizens.
5. See A. GIDDENS, CAPITALISM AND MODERN SOCIAL THEORY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
WRITINGS OF MARX, DUMMXEIM AmI MAX WEBER (1971).
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Constitutionalism is often distinguished from dictatorship, but even
dictatorships possess some characteristics of constitutionalism on a
restricted scale. Indeed, when the sphere of politics is confined to the
relationships between the members of a ruling class, all regimes are
to some extent constitutional. This is little more than a tautology; a
generalization from the fact that one way of describing the members
of a ruling class is those whose exercise of political power cannot
easily be withdrawn from them without threatening the stability of the
society as a whole. Gaetano Mosca described how this happens when
ruling classes surround themselves with self-protective "juridical de-
fenses."6 In order to defend their prerogatives, ruling classes institute
rule-of-law protections, and in order to stabilize their regimes, such pro-
tections are extended to a broadening social base. From this point of
view, a study of comparative constitutionalism would begin with a socio-
logical description of the ruling establishments of the societies in ques-
tion. Constitutional democracy would judge these societies on the basis
of two criteria: (1) the size of the fraction of the whole of these people
who could be said to participate in political power, and (2) the extent
to which those people were truly representative of the society's indigen-
ous social and power groupings. And this is, in effect, the way scholars
typically study comparative constitutionalism. However, there is still
something missing.
We know that the constitution of each country reflects in some sense
the broad sociological configurations of its people. But beyond this,
it also seems true that in some countries the constitution is able to serve
as a kind of democratic magnifier of civic wisdom; able somehow to
produce the actual effects of greater democracy and deeper wisdom
than seems practically possible in modem society. The formal proper-
ties of the democratic constitution of the French Third Republic were
not markedly different from those of British democracy, yet the British
always seemed able to maintain a larger degree of political wisdom than
was possible in France. Political scientists lamely attributed this to the
superior constitutional morality of the British, as if a constitutional
multiplier effect was somehow able to operate in England. But when
we try to come closer to understanding just how this magnifying action
works-when it does so-we find constitutionalism to be an extremely
elusive concept.
Usually, the attempt to identify how this so-called magnification of
6. G. MoscA, Tm RuLwnG CLASS 100, 120, 126-52, 228-29, 469-70, 475 (H. Kahn
transl. 1939) [hereinafter cited as MoSCA].
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democratic civic wisdom is brought about by some constitutions and not
by others has been a taxonomic effort, like that applied by Aristotle
to the study of governmental forms. Such a study might yield a gen-
eral theory of governmental forms. Upon completing such a study,
one might be able to give an abstract answer to the question, "What
is a constitution?" But this would not be the same as answering the
question, "What is constitutionalism?" A taxonomic analysis of the
constitutions of Britain, France, Germany and Italy during the mid-
1920's reveals only miniscule differences between them. But scholars
nonetheless are almost unanimous in judging that only Britain exhibited
the principles of constitutionalism.
Again, to speak of constitutionalizing something-the military, the
secret police, education or science-means more than merely providing
for them through supportive governmental agencies: to nationalize and
to constitutionalize are not synonymous. On the contrary, the military,
the secret police, or the presidency may be "nationalized" and still func-
tion as a despotic threat in society. Such a threat leads to the demand
for constitutionalization-seeing that they function according to the
principles of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism, among other things,
attempts to elicit, protect and magnify the application of democratic
civic wisdom to the problems of government.
This feature distinguishes the theory of constitutionalism from gen-
eral political theory. The latter has been the staple of political philos-
ophy since Plato. The former came into its own only after the demo-
cratic revolutions that began in the 17th century. The democratic
feature, which will be discussed later as the "institutionalization of civil
disobedience,"7 made the basic difference and also complicated the
problem. Modem constitutionalism attempted to solve the problem of
making government at once popular and proper. The task is better
stated in reverse: to prevent despotism and inhibit corruption, while
at the same time governing effectively. Of course, this was easier for
the first liberal constitutional democracies to accomplish than it is for
today's bureaucratic monoliths. They were able to reduce to a mini-
mum what government did. The Americans did this and then devised
an intricate governmental mechanism which was powered by the forces
of democracy and yet controlled by a series of self-activating inhibitory
governmental mechanisms. The design specifications for the 1789
Constitution, in effect, called for an automatic peace, freedom, justice
and order machine. After a few minor adjustments of the feed-back
7. See pt. I infra.
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mechanisms, it very nearly-or at least more nearly than any other-
came up to the design specifications. This near automaticity made it
the marvel of the world, and it was the feature that so stubbornly
eluded other constitutional designers and contributed to the mystique
of modem constitutionalism. It is also the feature that no longer
works.
In the 18th century, constitutional automaticity was expressed in
terms of classical mechanics; nowadays it is described in terms of feed-
back mechanisms. Indeed, the initial checks and balances system of
the United States Constitution lends itself quite well to exposition ac-
cording to the principles of information theory. However, one of its
ingredients is the rule of law, and a much more primitive feedback
system generated its characteristic doctrines and practices. The rule
of law is the first of constitutionalism's twin ingredients to require ex-
ploration. This will be done through an anthropological and historical
investigation of the institutional roots from which the rule of law de-
veloped. Following that the English historical foundations of consti-
tutionalism's democratic component-the institutionalization of civil
disobedience-will be explored. Next, a critical evaluation of modern
theories of constitutionalism will permit drawing some final conclusions
about solutions to the contemporary constitutional crisis.
II. THE INVENTION OF THE RULE OF LAW
A. Introduction
A law of physical nature purports to state an invariable relationship
between material components of the environment. An example is the
law of the rate of acceleration of falling bodies. But "Natural Law"
refers to human beings. It purports to state a relationship that ought
to hold between human beings if they are to provide themselves with
optimum benefits and enjoyments. According to Natural Law doctrine,
a Natural Law may not "exist" or actually ever have been followed by
any human being, but nonetheless it may be called "true." It is said
to be "true!' and applicable to all human beings because it can be dis-
covered by human reason, and wherever it is followed, its alleged bene-
fits will be enjoyed.
A famous example of a Natural Law is the maxim: "pacta servanda
sunt" (contracts must be kept). This Natural Law proposition can be
read as stating that implicit in the existence of human society at how-
ever primitive a level is the keeping of agreements and contracts. It
is impossible to imagine human society without this principle, though
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the principle may be more or less extensively applied, and it may be
well or ill observed. The members of a society may not realize that
the keeping of contracts is implicit in their having a society at all-it
is not necessary that a society know it is following a Natural Law in
order to benefit from it. It is not necessary to the theoretical existence
of Natural Law that anyone ever discover it. Natural Law "exists" in
the form of rules implicit in the natures of men individually and collec-
tively. Natural Law is like an axiom of geometry in one sense: it can-
not be repealed, but it can be ignored.
Natural Law is not a rule of morals. Morality tells us the nature
of good and bad. Natural Law is often given moral content, but this
is not a necessary part of Natural Law. Pacta servanda sunt can be in-
terpreted as carrying moral obligation, but it also can be interpreted
as carrying no more than functional obligation: one of the minimum
functional prerequisites to having human society. Hans Kelsen used
this principle as the basis for working out a general theory of law which
carried only non-ethical obligation.8
Natural Law is not a folkway. A society may have many customs
and folkways which carry only local or temporal significance. It may
be the custom that whenever someone fails to keep an agreement, he
can be challenged to a duel by the aggrieved party. The folkway pro-
viding for private enforcement through dueling is a local arrangement,
but enforcement of the obligation of contract is a feature applicable to
human society in general.
The suggestion that there is such a thing as functional, as distinct from
moral, obligation raises some serious philosophical problems. Since the
time of Hume and Kant it has been generally assumed that there can
be no valid way of deriving obligation from facts. Hume concluded
there is no obligation implicit in any facts.9 This famous argument by
Hume appeared to completely discredit teleology and Natural Law.
Nor was such a demonstration unexpected. Teleological approaches
to physical and social events had been under devastating attack from
scientists and empiricists for over a hundred years. Hume's demonstra-
tions merely rationalized what might be called the "ideology" of the
physical science approach to the interpretation of empirical data. Kan-
tian phenomenology appeared to clothe Hume's propositions with logi-
cal unassailability.'0
8. H. KELsEN, PURE THEOtRy oF LAw (M. Knight transl. 1967).
9. D. HuME, MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 33 (H. Aiken ed. 1948) [hereinafter
cited as HUME].
10. G. SABNE, A IsToRY OF PoLTcAL THEORY 605 (1937).
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The interesting thing is that when Hume himself wrote about politi-
cal theory, he ignored the strictures about fact, value and reason
contained in his philosophical writings, and properly so. Moral duties,
said Hume, carry obligation because of the "necessities of human
society"" and because of the impossibility of having human society "if
these duties were neglected.' 12
A small degree of experience and observation suffices to teach us that
society cannot possibly be maintained without the authority of the magi-
strates, and that this authority must soon fall into contempt where exact
obedience is not paid to it. The observation of these general and ob-
vious interests is the source of all allegiance, and of that moral obligation
which we attribute to it. If the reason be asked of that obedience,
which we are bound to pay to government, I readily answer. Because
society could not otherwise subsist. 1
Hume's ethics are clearly functional. Its authority derives from the na-
ture of things-Montesquieu's "necessary relations of things."' 4  In
short, Hume used logic to derive value from fact, and he did so with
considerable validity. But it was only possible for his conclusions to
be valid because human beings had also done in practice what he had
done in theory. Both human beings and Hume could do this because
cultural "facts" are qualitatively different from physical "facts"; they
contain certain types of values at their core. An exploration of how
beings discover and utilize these values will help us derive the process
through which first, Natural Law, and then the rule of law, was in-
vented.
B. An Anthropology of Natural Law
Anthropologists have taught us that primitives are not "child-like"
adults and that primitive cultures do not contain built-in teleological de-
velopmental or evolutionary patterns which determine them to grow
from simple to more complex cultural forms. Moreover, if cultural
transitions do take place in primitive cultures, there is no basis for as-
suming that one specific new cultural form must always develop out
of a given simpler form. In particular, there is no reason for assuming
that because primitive Greek culture developed into a quite sophisti-
11. HUME, supra note 9, at 367.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. This famous statement is the opening sentence of C. MoNTmsQumu, L'EsPmrr DEs
Lois (T. Nugent transl. 1949). The discussion by E. DuRXHErM, MoNTESQULEU AND
ROSSEAu: FORERuNNERs oF SocioLorY 36 (1960), remains the best treatment of this
concept.
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cated civilization in a specific evolutionary pattern, any other primitive
culture would ever experience the same development. We may use
evidence drawn from Greek experience, but we may not imply that hu-
man nature in general or any other social system in particular must fol-
low the same pattern. However, the fact that the Greeks did exploit
their own specific developmental pattern holds important lessons for
us. It happens, however, that in the case of the Greeks we are able
to uncover a useful structural explanation of their development of nat-
ural law and idealism.
An animistic world view is found in many sophisticated as well as
many primitive cultures. In such a view, all things exhibit principles
of life and will. Each thing in the world, including the world itself,
may contain a "soul," even though there may be distinctions between
the sacred and the profane. Nothing is inanimate or lifeless. There
is no death in the world in the modem Western sense of death, for
that notion of death meant the conversion of something animate into
something inanimate. In an animistic culture death may be terrifying,
but it is also a transition to another form of "life."
Until the 17th century, the official world of the West was animis-
tic. It was only with the ascendency of modem physical science that
animism was excluded from specified realms of existence and mater-
ial things were no longer regarded as containing souls within them-
selves. The physical universe as described by science no longer ex-
hibited will, either its own or God's. It was regarded as being ex-
plainable without regard to any spiritual or external principle of causa-
tion; causation could be explained on the basis of relationships intrinsic
to the system under observation. However, the development of inani-
mate scientific relationships took place in a direct progression out of
animate, quasi-magical relationships. Astrology was a very sophisti-
cated way of studying and measuring the motions of heavenly bodies.
It attained great mathematical sophistication and great predictive
power, while still within the realm of magical explanation and magical
assumptions about the connection between happenings in the macrocos-
mos and the microcosmos. The transition from astrology to astronomy,
rom alchemy to chemistry and from Paracelsan magical medicine to
scientific medicine are only three of the most prominent instances of
transitions from magical animistic systems to scientific inanimate sys-
tems.
But medieval animism itself was already a sophisticated approach,
and it developed out of anthropomorphic precursors in much the same
' LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
way that it gave way to scientific successors. Anthropomorphism is a
form of animism in which the things of the world are visualized and
thought about as if they had not only souls but also manlike personali-
ties. The religions and the cosmologies of Greece and Rome were
both animistic and anthropomorphic. Their gods and goddesses sym-
bolized departments of nature such as rivers, forests, agriculture, and
heavenly bodies, as well as the arts, sciences and virtues. Anthropo-
morphism is itself a highly rationalized and "scientific" approach for
it permits connecting together observed occurrences from some area
of experience into a coherent narrative with great explanatory power.
The moon in a non-anthropomorphic culture may be the object of
mystery and fetishistic magic, but little can be made out of it unless
there is some symbolic idiom through which its phases and motions can
be connected together and also connected to other events which seem
to be related to the moon. But once the moon is "seen" in anthropo-
morphic terms, a very complex "science" of the moon can be devel-
oped. The story of the moon can be told in terms of human and super-
human biographical events. The Greeks and Romans developed a
marvelously intricate myth-science for all departments of human exper-
ience on the basis of anthropomorphic myths.
Although anthropomorphic "science" has very low efficacy when
compared to the inanimate sciences of the modem West, it is nonethe-
less extremely efficacious. Quite complex and sophisticated civilizations
can be built on anthropomorphic foundations. However, there is one
great difference between anthropomorphic and inanimate sciences.
Anthropomorphic sciences are basically "political" sciences. The rela-
tionships between men and the universe, and the relationships between
parts of the universe, are seen and interpreted in nearly the same terms
as are the relationships that men have with each other.
Inanimate science can be used to manipulate "things" which have
no wills of their own and are unable to prevent the manipulation from
taking place. Anthropomorphic science can be used to influence living
man-like gods who have wills of their own and might, but for the sys-
tem of power relationships and influences in which they exist, do some-
thing quite different and willful. We may guess some of the reasons
that pre-urban Greeks came to visualize the events they experienced
in political terms.
Pre-urban Greeks were highly integrated into their cultural order.
Even though with them, as with many primitive peoples, various cults
were monopolized by different families and secret societies, there was
[Vol. 8
19753 THE FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 519
very little that was kept from each member of the society. Religion
was an elaborately social process, requiring the participation of every
member. The fundamental myths belonged to the society as a whole
and were shared by every member. The system of rules and roles fol-
lowed by the society was assimilated thoroughly by each member as
he was ritually initiated through his various life stages.
Though there was specialization of labor, even at very primitive
levels no technology was so completely intellectualized that it could not
be understood by each member. Others might have been more skilled
at house making, boat making, weapon making, or hunting than any
ordinary member; nonetheless, each member understood all of these
other functions, saw how they fitted into the function of the society,
and thereby was integrated into his culture and felt at one with it. In
pre-urban Greek society the individual, in maturing, participated in al-
most every phase of his culture, appreciated the significance of its
"science' and, through his own participation in it, assimilated his cul-
ture, integrating it as he integrated himself with its goals.
It is slightly different, however, with the area that we in modem
times have distinguished as the inanimate physical environment. What
we call the physical environment seems more chaotic and terroristic to
pre-urban people than it does to Western man. In their anthropomor-
phic and demonological myths and in their animistic magic, pre-urban
people in general picture the physical universe as a vast and frightening
animated arena featuring the willful struggles of titanic forces. With-
out making our rigid separation between cultural and physical univer-
ses, they nonetheless see the two as exhibiting slightly different mani-
festations of the same governing forces. What appears in modem
science as an ordered physical universe appears to pre-urban man as
a multi-form and even chaotic struggle whose outcome is in doubt from
moment to moment.
Being highly integrated into their social order but disoriented toward
the physical universe, primitive men often react with a kind of reverse
positivism and project into the terroristic and hostile physical environ-
ment "political" and "lawful" elements similar to those they see at work
in their social system. 5 The resulting anthropomorphic or "demonolo-
gical' cosmology accounts for otherwise nonunderstandable events.' 6
15. "On first looking upon the external world, man pictured it to himself as a sort
of confused republic, where rival forces made war upon each other" NuMA DENIs Fus-
TEL DE COULANGES, THE ANcIENT CITY 121 (1956).
16. See W. LA BARRE, THE GHosT DANcE: OIGINs OF RELIGION 31-68 (1970).
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Pre-urban Greek cosmology "politicized" the physical universe through
a mythology that explained how original cosmic rulers brought order
out of chaos.
Such anthropomorphic cosmic rulers were approached in the same
way as were earthly rulers. One had to learn how to earn their favor,
how to propitiate the great demons who wielded power throughout the
universe.
mhe structure and behavior of the world were held to be continuous
with-a mere extension or projection of-the structure and behavior of
human society. The human group and the departments of Nature sur-
rounding it were unified in one solid fabric or moirai--one comprehen-
sive system of custom and -taboo. The divisions of Nature were limited
by moral boundaries, because they were actually the same as the divi-
sions of society. 17
Politicized cosmic demonology may occur when men are well oriented
toward their social system but disoriented toward their physical uni-
verse.
It is by no means the case that the process being described here oc-
curred only in Ancient Athens. On the contrary, Mircea Eliade has
documented its universality.' 8 Paul Wheatly has found remarkable
evidence of a similar process at work in ancient China.
The collective memory of traditional society is by no means unresponsive
to happenings in the past but, unable to retain individual persons and
specific events, transforms them respectively into archetypes and cate-
gories, heroes and heroic situations. And because myth is the ultimate,
not the primal stage, in the creation of these archetypes, it is often haz-
ardous to attempt to reverse the process and to isolate the paradigm at
the core of the legend. .... 19
Wheatley argues that ancient Chinese cities, like those of the ancient
Mediterranean world, were constructed as a sacred precinct, a resi-
dence of the gods, and an axis mundi.2 °
Anthropomorphism is the name we give to man's tendency to
"create' nature, God and heaven in his own image; and the evidence
for this tendency is copious, especially in the case of the Greeks.
Durkheim treated all religion as an expression of man's collective
needs, and following his suggestion, many brilliant interpretations of
17. F. CoONFoRD, FROM RELIGION TO PHILOSOPHY 55 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
RELIGION TO PHILOsoPHY].
18. M. EL DE, CosMosAND HISTORY: THE MYTH oF T ETERNAL RETuRN (1959).
19. P. WHEATLEY, THE PIVOT OF Tm FOR QuARTERS xv (1971).
20. Id. at 481.
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primitive cosmologies and religions have been made. But the collec-
tive representations of cultural needs are not made in a random fashion.
The "world" of Odysseus, according to M. I. Finley, portrayed the func-
tional ethic of 8th century Greece,2' but it portrayed the ethic that was
characteristic of heroic models whose actions were also shaped by the
fact that they were derived from more primitive rituals. Moreover, the
heavenly images were constructed in a special way. Olympianism was
monarchial deism, but it was not a simple mirror image of the everyday
institutions and practices of the Greeks reflected into the heavens. It
is not possible to tell the story of the heavens in earthy terms maintain-
ing in that story all of the variability, randomness, and accident that
actually occur daily in the culture. Merely to retell the story of some
event requires the storyteller to eliminate some of the multifarious hap-
penings which were contemporaneous with that event in order to por-
tray the particular event in question rather than several others. The
storyteller must abstract a certain sequence of happenings out of their
web of cultural connectedness, whether or not he is aware of going
through an abstraction process. This abstraction process is even more
evident when a culture builds itself a heaven. Longfellow, in The
Song of Hiawatha, provides us with a quaint illustration of the process
involved.
Hiawatha: saw the moon rise from the water
Rippling, rounding from the water,
Saw the flecks and shadows on it,
Whispered, "What is that, Nokomis?"
And the good Nokomis answered:
"Once a warrior, very angry,
Seized his grandmother, and threw her
Up into the sky at midnight;
Right against the moon he threw her;
'Tis her body that you see there."22
This poetic description illustrates the human abstraction process at
its most elementary level. The moon may have previously "existed"
as something mysterious and magical. But so long as it "existed" un-
qualified and undifferentiated, the culture could make little of it.
However, the angry warrior "projects" his grandmother into the
heavens, superimposing her on the "moon." The moon is now no lon-
ger merely something anonymously magical and mysterious. Now it
is alive in the sense that a woman is alive. Now the moon "is" a wo-
21. M. FiNLEY, Tim WoRLD or ODYSSEUS 114-54 (1954).
22. 2 LONGFELLOW'S POETICAL WoRKs 135 (1886).
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man-a white goddess, 23 perhaps. Now the "story" of the moon can
be told, for the story of the moon is the biography of a woman-like
heavenly person. Movements of the moon which were previously un-
intelligible now become events of the life of a person. Relationships
between the moon goddess and the sun god can be told in human
terms. The moon's phases, its connection with the tides, its connection
with the seasons, with fertility and with the female menstrual cycle can
all be woven together into a novelistic tale: the myth of the moon god-
dess. As more and more heavenly events are incorporated into the an-
thropomorphic biography of the moon goddess and her reign, the result
is a more and more complex "science." This science may be metic-
ulously accurate from a mathematical standpoint and yet retain its por-
tion of magic. This was true of astrology. As the study of heavenly
relationships becomes more and more exact, it may find itself depend-
ing less and less on the anthropomorphic and magical framework
through which the science was given birth. The transition to astronomy
as the study of self-contained relationships becomes possible. But the
ability to make the abstractions depended upon the original projection
of an anthropomorphic rationale onto heavenly occurrences. The
moon and its motions and relationships could not be "seen!' until "she!'
could be seen in the imagery of a white goddess. This projected
imagery enabled us to rationalize and systematize lunar events. These
events could only then be separated from-abstracted from-the
imagery (white goddess) which made them possible. Myth, astrology
and astronomy proceed from each other in successive abstraction opera-
tions. Myths are to this extent cultural mirrors or projection machines
that reflect into the heavens and "store" there structural features and
relationships that are familiar on earth. Once the projection has taken
place the resulting picture can be seen and analyzed as a picture.
Something similar may be involved in the way an artist projects an
image from his subject matter. Having projected an image-onto can-
vas, in marble, or in written imagery-the artist can then concentrate
on the properties of the projected imagery rather than on the original
subject matter from which the image was projected. The original pro-
jection maneuver is an aesthetic achievement. But once a gifted artist
has made such a projection his process and his techniques can be an-
alyzed. The steps he followed can be studied and explained. The
whole process can be "scientized." And even though the "scientific"
23. See R. Gi.AuEs, THE WmTE GODDESS: A HISToRiCAL GRAMMAR OF POETC MYTH
at iv (1958).
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or "academic" imitators who follow a great artist may not produce great
art, they can produce comparable images in a comparable fashion.
Much of the myth content of a culture is produced in the same way
that artists produce their images. Homely, everyday features of the cul-
ture are projected into the heavens. This process of making the
heavenly projections automatically and unconsciously achieves an "ab-
straction" of cultural forms in the same way that an artist's image is
an abstraction from his subject matter. But as with the artist, cultural
projections "utopianize," in Karl Mannheim's sense, 4 the cultural ele-
ments that are projected. It is not possible for the projection process
to work any other way. One cannot make a myth of all of the diverse
events of the culture. If the myth is to tell the story of the marriage
between the moon goddess and the sun god, the courtship and family
system used for the myth will be one that is "typical" for the culture,
not one that is atypical. It will be a type of marriage that is possible
and believable for the members of the culture which develops the myth.
As it involves wondrous and magical personages, it may also be a type
of marriage that is "ideal." There can also be stories of "typical" failures
in a culture, and these will have their place in some of that culture's
myths; but for the chief cosmological actors in the myth system it will
be "ideal-typical," in Max Weber's sense, 25 success patterns that are
chosen.
Another example of unconscious ideal-typical images is often found
in dreams. There is copious evidence of this not only in psychoanalytic
literature but also in ancient literature. In Homer the evidence is
strong that poets of his day treated dreams as if they were objective
fact without making a rigid qualitative distinction between experiences
of the waking and the sleeping worlds. Eric R. Dodds suggests that
early Greeks were conscious of living in two worlds-the dream and
the sensible worlds-without attributing unreality to the dream imagery
and myth imagery.26 Hence, the Greeks were richly endowed with
sources from which ideal-typical patterns could be drawn. But it
is not necessary to account precisely for how ideal-typical patterns
may have become unconsciously projected, into the heavens. It is
enough to remark on the fact of the projection. And on this fact the
evidence is incontrovertible. It is also undeniable that the ideal-typical
features that are projected into the heavens are taken from behavioral
24. K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (L. Worth & E. Shils transl. 1954).
25. M. WEBER, EssAYs IN SOCIOLOGY (H. Gerth & C. Mills transl. 1946).
26. E. DODDS, THE GREEKS AND THE IRRATIONAL (1959).
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norms and cultural forms. The order of the universe is pictured as if
it operated on principles similar to those of the cultural order.
Behind the Olympian god stands "a remote power, which is both
primary-older than the gods themselves-and moral. It is called
Moira, Destiny."27  Moira stands for the "provincial ordering of the
world. . . a representation of Necessity and Justice (Must and Ought)
.... "28 Moira is the first stage of the projection process-an un-
qualified realm of obligation and necessity. Zeus is but a thinly veiled
Homeric pater familias-a supernatural, ideal-typical Head of the
Household. "It was natural," said Dodds, "to project on to the heav-
enly Father those curious mixed feelings about the human one which
the child dared not acknowledge even to himself."2 9
Jane Harrison allows us to make an extended picture of the degree
of cultural projection. "[B]ehind Gala the Mother, and above even
Zeus the Father, stands always the figure of Themis." 30 Themis is con-
ventional law: moral norm. It is what will later become Natural Law.
Dike is closely related to the "way" or the order of the cosmos. Greek
Dike to us carries some of the feeling of behavioral norm rather than
scientific law, but this is because it describes the behavioral norms of an
animistic universe. Dike has to do with the succession of seasons, the
course of the heavens: the behavioral instincts of nature. Themis is
Olympian; Dike is chthonian. Harrison made the reasonable suggestion
that Themis is mother of Dike for the same reason that God is the law-
giver of the universe: man wants to control events; he wants right con-
duct to bring prosperity."1 Accordingly he makes "science" the daugh-
ter of "politics." No Greek philosopher reversed this order. In making
the order of the physical universe dependent upon the order of the cul-
tural universe, the Greeks merely confirmed the overall pattern of their
scientific imagery which consisted of a projection into the heavens of
myth encased abstractions drawn from their own cultural order.
Hesiod, at the close of his story of Zeus, related the foundation of
the heavenly order with anthropological accuracy. Hesiod tells of the
"institution of a social order... symbolized by the obviously allegori-
cal marriage of Zeus with Themis (law) and the birth of their children,
the Seasons whose names are Good Government, Justice, and Peace,
and the Fates (Moira), who gave to mortal men their portions of good
27. H. RosE, ANCmNT GREEK RELIGION (1948).
28. RELIGION TO PILosomny, supra note 17, at 21.
29. E. Domns, THE GREExs AND THE IDRRA-ONAL 48 (1959).
30. J. HfimsoN, THBEMns at xxii (1963).
31. Id. at 516-31.
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and evil .... ,32 "It will hardly be denied," comments Cornford,
"that we have there the divine counterpart of the installation of a new
earthly king, or the annual renewal of his authority over his people and
of his power over nature. 83 In another connection Cornford had ar-
gued that philosophy inherited its notions of God and Soul from primi-
tive religion. Philosophy also got from religion (in this projection
process) the "governing conception of a certain order of Nature, vari-
ously regarded as a dominion of Destiny, of Justice, or of Law. .. .
For this reason the reign of Necessity in the universe "is also and
equally a moral rule, a kingdom of Justice."35
Quite simply, what has happened is that the Greeks projected an or-
der into the universe that was an analogue of their own cultural order.
Two things followed from this. It was an order of obligation and
morality administered by gods in the same way that the earthly order
of obligation and morality was administered by the earthly priest-king-
pater familias-the order of the universe was a reflection of the only
kind of order that was conceivable. This meant that the universe
automatically became what we would call a "Natural Law" universe
rather than a physical science universe. Secondly, and what is more
important at the moment, having projected a Natural Law order into
the universe, the nature of that kind of order could be pictured; it could
be "seen" and it could be analyzed. Natural Law became visible in
the heavens. This permitted, and indeed made inevitable, a second
stage in the process. This second stage was the counter-projection, or
feedback, of Natural Law from the heavens to the very earthly institu-
tions from which it had been derived in the first place.
The original projection process had automatically produced ideal-
typical norms for the heavens. These were abstractions from the quasi-
symbolic behavioral norms of the culture. The abstractions existed in
the form of narrative myths relating the characteristics of Themis and
Dike. The characteristics of Themis and Dike could be seen and an-
alyzed in these myth containers, and their behavioral implications could
be converted into authoritative rules applicable to human relations.
Coherent with this is Cornford's admonition that the ancient philoso-
phers were always non-scientific. They did not seek to explain things
but sought rather for "that knowledge which must direct the conduct
32. F. CoRuu-oa), PRINCmIUM SAPiENTm 248 (1952) [hereinafter cited as PRINcipIUM
SAPIENTIAE].
33. Id.
34. RELIGION TO PHILOSOPHY, supra note 17, at 5.
35. Id.
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of human life.""6 And in contemporary terms the result was a norma-
tive feedback control system.
Behind philosophy there is law and religion:
[Blehind religion, as we now see, lies social custom-the structure and
institutions of the human group.... Moira, the supreme power in the
universe, was very closely allied to Nomos, in the sense of constitutional
order. Now it appears that Moira is simply a projection, or extension,
of Nomos from the tribal group to the elemental grouping of the cosmos.
We can read a new sense into the apophthegm ascribed to Pythagoras,
that "Themis in the realm of Zeus, and Dike in the world below, hold
the same place and rank as Nomos in the cities of men; so that he who
does not justly perform his appointed duty, may appear as a violator
of the whole order of the universe."
8 7
Both Cornford and Pythagoras are talking about the process described
above as projection and counter-projection: a feedback loop through
which Natural Law was invented. A philosopher like Anaximander
then moves on to a further step. For what Anaximander did was to
take the old Homeric personalized controls, remove their supernatural
character, eliminating Zeus and his fellow Olympians. There is still
a moral order in which Justice prevails; but the will of a personal God
has disappeared, giving place to natural causes and eternal motion. ' 8
Plato moves a step further when he rationalizes the entire system of
order into an ideal-typical constitution which carries the authority of
an absolute ethic and also the standard by which human affairs can be
judged and ruled. Aristotle's "final cause" was a further extension of
this process and one which led to the formal enunciation of Natural
Law as an explicit doctrine. This closed the feedback loop.
The point of this discussion has been to illustrate the way in which
human beings, merely as they go about the business of producing hu-
man culture, also produce Natural Law as a direct consequence. Nat-
ural Law can be produced because human culture is quasi-symbolic;
because myth systems projected from quasi-symbolic behavioral norms
exist in the form of ideal-typical abstractions from the behavioral norms,
and in this form provide standards of value for the judgment of be-
havioral norms. The process is similar to that of the time and motion
study engineer who produces standards for evaluating production work-
ers by abstracting ideal-typical norms from his observations of actual
production behavior. This is a naturalistic view of Natural Law, but
36. paNcipium SAPiENTIAE, supra note 32, at 46.
37. RELIGION TO PHILOSOPHY, supra note 17, at 54 (footnote omitted).
38. Id. at 41.
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it is possible to take such a view because, whether or not they call it
by that name, human beings produce Natural Law "naturally."
C. The Validity of Law
Natural Law carries the implication of obligation, and it has a factual
foundation. The process through which man produces Natural Law
disproves Hume's proposition that values cannot be derived from facts.
Cultural facts simply do not exist without norms-values-built into
them. This is the foundation for the ancient view of political science,
as well as of constitutionalism and the "higher law." Indeed, one way
of stating the conclusion of the foregoing analysis is to say that a sound
political science would yield policy recommendations possessing a form
similar to that of Natural Law propositions. Something like this has
frequently turned up in jurisprudence. 9 Moreover, the procedures of
the English common law, the rule of law tradition and constitutionalism
have all developed in a fashion analogous to the process at work in the
creation of Natural Law. For, as we shall see shortly, the same projec-
tion, counter-projection feedback process occurred. However, an im-
portant difference concerns the problem of validity.
Natural Law, as we have seen already, not only is produced naturally,
but also is self-validating. This is so because although it was projected
from functioning cultural institutions, its derivation from those institu-
tions is not always apparent to the members of the culture. Natural
Law and related ethical rules appear to derive their validity from God
or some other transcendent principle. Because the actual political or-
der is seen to be aiming at the realization of these God-oriented rules,
the question of the validity of the political order does not arise. How-
ever, this problem does arise in the genesis of secular juridical systems.
This can be seen by considering the problem of freedom under law.
There are two basic ways to interpret freedom. The first and more
obvious is freedom from restraint; the second and more obscure way
is systemic. The first way is the view of freedom that most accords
with immediate impressions. It is the absence of anything that inhibits
the individual's desire to do anything he wishes.
Systemic freedom is the result of the more sophisticated reflection
that, in order to be able to do anything, it is necessary to follow or sub-
mit to the functional prerequisites for the achievement of that desire.
39. Wormuth, The Dilemma of Jurisprudence, 35 AM. POLITICAL SCIENCE REv. 44
(1941).
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Viewing man as a creature capable of employing tools and developing
powers it is possible to describe the systemic conditions under which
man's tools may be employed and under which man's powers may be
developed. A social system in which men can realize the maximum
potentiality of tools and develop their powers to a maximum point ob-
viously provides more freedom than would occur if each merely grati-
fied his wants freely and without restraint. On this fact rests the peren-
nial structuralist validity of social contract theories. Throughout most
of Western history, Natural Law has been the rubric under which sys-
temic freedom has been explained and discussed. However, a problem
arose when Natural Law came to have no greater claim to allegiance
than did theories analyzing the abstract properties of systemic freedom.
Traditionally, Natural Law had appealed to a higher authority for its
source of obligation. The ancient Stoics were the first to confront the
task of demonstrating the operational validity of Natural Law for a so-
ciety in which God was dead. The Stoic quest led ultimately to
attempts to provide naturalistic or scientific foundations for Natural
Law. This failed for two reasons. The first reason was pointed out
by MHume. If cultural events are regarded as facts similar in nature
to physical or material facts, we can prove that it is invalid to derive
values from such facts. Here, Natural Law is confronted with the
dilemma of being forced to choose between making its dictates matters
of faith or rejecting the attempt to provide law with a higher ground
of validity. The second reason for failure derives from the collective
nature of systemic freedom. This involves the problem discussed by
Plato in the first part of The Republic.
We distinguished the two forms of freedom on the individual level.
The same distinction applies with even more force on the collective
level. When systemic freedom is extended to collective rather than in-
dividual problems, it appears demonstrably true to those who "see" far
into the problem of collective behavior that each individual in a social
system may receive greater freedom if all persons adopt the impera-
tives of the system seen as a whole.
There is a simple logic by which this becomes apparent. If one
makes a theoretical extension of the spacial, the long run (in time),
functional (in "social space"), and the structural (organizational) con-
sequences of any projected collective act, one sees the projected act
in different ways from how the act is seen if it is considered from a
static, isolated, or individualistic viewpoint. The classic example of this
has to do with capital formation. A given group in a "corporation" has
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the problem of deciding whether to distribute its profits or to reinvest
them. At first thought it appears that each member of the group will
be better off if the profits are distributed. However, on further reflec-
tion it becomes clear that only a small portion of the share of profits
from each member, reinvested in capital development, will later make
available to each member much larger profits than would ever be pos-
sible if all profits were distributed as they are earned. The collective
acceptance of present restraints on profit enjoyment, as a precondition
to the greater future enjoyments of profits, is a collective dimension of
systemic freedom.
Natural Law had the virtue of revealing some of the elusive systemic
dimensions of freedom, for, as we have seen, Natural Law projects the
general, the long-run (in time, function, structure and space) and the
collective implications of different types of human behavior. For when
a society produces ideal-typical patterns of behavior for its gods and
heroes, what it does is to speculate on the collective implications of var-
ious patterns of behavior when they are generalized for all persons,
when the long run consequences of such patterns are projected, and
when such patterns are considered from the standpoint of how well or
ill they fit with the other patterns of behavior that go to make up a
concatenated social system. In addition, a myth system-as a so-
cial system in operation-contains the revelation-the authoritative
assurance-that the system will work. That is, it contains the lesson
that a social system is more than the sum of its individuals. This "more
than" element, which is the "profit" accruing to individuals for making
their social system work, would not otherwise be intelligible to individ-
uals. It would be "utopian" and impractical if it were simply described
speculatively or in a treatise on political theory. Few who looked only
at the literary description of the hypothetical system could perceive that
it might work. But seeing it at work in a myth system induces confi-
dence in its social workability as well as, or because of, the faith in its
validity induced by an authoritative myth.
All of these achievements, which are non-rationally illustrated in
myth systems, are abstractly and theoretically described in the Natural
Law systems derived from them. But being tied to their mythical foun-
dations, Natural Law systems, in common with the theological and phil-
osophical systems that are also derived from myth systems, carry impli-
cations of universality, absoluteness and infinity. That is, the obligation
possessed by Natural Law is dogmatic rather than functional; infinite
rather than finite. A finite behavioral norm made universal and in-
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finite is an absolute ethic. But there is no valid way of proceeding from
finite particulars to infinite universals. This is the basic fallacy toward
which Natural Law tends. Natural Law hides from itself its mundane
cultural origins in an effort to preserve its claim to normative validity,
but in doing so it sacrifices its claim to logical and theoretical validity.
It is not possible to relate cultural facts into a logically valid theoretical
system that will have absolute normative validity. The only validity
that can be given a norm of behavior is to prove that it is the logically
necessary "efficient cause," or facilitator, for a given "final cause" or
goal. Prescriptive norms of behavior may have only formal, instrumen-
tal validity. This may be a sufficient ground of validity for the social
theorist, but social systems are not made up of social theorists. And
no social system will work unless the lowliest and least speculative
members of the system are as fully persuaded of the necessity and
validity of the system's behavioral norms as are the most astute social
theorists. This is the problem constitutionalism must solve.
This is not a problem in simple social systems. Under extremely
simple conditions there is an immediate and transparent connection be-
tween the individualistic and the systemic implications of ordinary de-
cision-making problems. The extended implications of even such seri-
ous problems as deciding for or against war or peace can be portrayed
to all in tribal councils and assemblies. Such institutions effectively re-
veal the alternative goals that are possible and the individual behavioral
implications attached to each competing proposal or goal. The means
that must be willed in order to will ends are observable and understand-
able to all. Primitive politics are self-validating in this operational sense
as well as because it partakes of the overall validity of the universe.
But once social conditions and political problems become so complex
that decisions affecting all must be resolved in remote and intricate
institutions, an unbridgeable gap appears between the individualist and
systemic implications of an action. People are deprived of any basis
for perceiving the systemic validity of the prescriptive norms required
of them. Ultimately they must simply have faith in the validity of their
social system. They are presented by their society with a task that must
be made to appear to them to be morally right inasmuch as its systemic
validity cannot be perceived. The English common law is an example
of how this process can work.
D. The Unwritten Law
Historians of the English common law and of English constitution-
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alism often refer to medieval English law as "folk" law. Such discus-
sions leave the impression that there was some mystical spirit or "geisf'
controlling and directing English culture. Any such notion is obviously
reminiscent of Natural Law and "higher" law doctrines and repugnant to
those with a materialist or positivist bent. Already in the 17th century
the opposition between Francis Bacon and Sir Edward Coke, the "father
of the common law," turned upon this issue. Coke's theories of the com-
mon law and of the "artificial reason and judgment of law" implied
a principle of sovereignty and a source of authority that was higher than
that of the king.40 Bacon gave a positivist defense of the established
legal and monarchial order.41 Bacon's jurisprudence was thoroughly
naturalistic; he was the first of the legal realists. Thomas Hobbes, who
began his career as Bacon's secretary, extended this approach from law
to the entire political order.42  This debate has continued down to the
present day.
There is no doubt that the main outlines of the English common law
system were formed during the early middle ages. England was then
a primitive culture, and the common law retains yet today many marks
of its primitive origins. It is called a system of "unwritten" law.
Judges study precedents ferreted out of the opinions of earlier judges
as they search for "the law" applicable to cases and disputes arising be-
fore them. On this basis they announce their "opinion!' of how "the
law" applies to the new case. Judges hand down "opinions" of the impli-
cations of the law and this permits them to render "decisions" in particu-
lar cases. But their opinion of the law was formed from earlier opinions,
and these, in their turn, were of the same sort as their own--earlier
"opinions" of how "the law" applied to earlier cases. Where, then, is
"the law"? The answer is that it is "unwritten." No common law
judge has ever written down "the law" concretely. Every common law
judge who has ever existed has only written down opinions of how "the
law" applied to particular cases. "The law" doesn't "exist" in any con-
crete sense and never has. It is almost inconceivable that anyone start-
ing out to invent a legal system would have invented this one. And
yet it developed in a perfectly intelligible way.
From the earliest times two of the distinctive features of the common
40. CoKE's REPORTS, pt. xii, at 65.
41. See F. BACON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF KING IENRY THE SnvEmNi (F.
Levy ed. 1972).
42. The bridge between Bacon's jurisprudence and Hobbes' mature political philoso-
phy is found in T. HoBBES, A DIAi.OGuE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF
Tr COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND 12 (J. Cropsey ed. 1971).
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law have been its jury system and its rules of evidence. Both of these
developed from primitive legal practices. In preliterate England law
was customary and "heroic." It was heroic in a sense common to many
primitive cultures. It was best expressed by certain "cultural para-
gons." These were revered older men who best expressed, remem-
bered and preserved the culture's ethic and customs. The law was
preserved in their memories and it was expressed in their actions.
They did not "own" the law 'personally; everyone owned it equally and
in common. But there often arose disputes over the law and over what
was right. Two parties in conflict with each other would each claim
to have right on their side. That is, each would claim to be following
the law. The problem was to decide which law was "the law"; which
law was right. Litigants entered court each bringing with him his own
laws, and the problem was to "try" the law. For this purpose jurors-
culture paragons-were called to say (swear) what the law was. The
general principle, which is preserved today only in constitutional law,
was that "old law breaks new law," and this was another reason for hav-
ing the jury composed of the older culture paragons. The problem was
to find out-to "discover"-what was the "good old law" by asking the
most prominent elders to say how such problems were dealt with in
the old days. Although there were many distinct types of jury trials,
one prominent type was devoted to resolving conflicting hypotheses
about what the law was. An implicit assumption of the process was
that "the law" inhered in the culture and could be discovered and ap-
plied to individual disputes by following the appropriate law discovery
method. Law was not "invented" or considered to be man-made until
the 17th century. Even then, Lord Coke, the "father of the common
law," gave strength to the anti-Stuart faction with his historical re-
searches purporting to prove that the old law supported their claims
against the king and hence "broke" the new decrees of James I. The
parliamentary party, in effect, hypostatized a constitution-a common
law constitution.
During the 16th century a revolution occurred in the rules of
evidence. This happened in conjunction with the transformation of the
jury from a repository of knowledge about the good old laws into judges
of the facts about a given dispute. For after law records and books
had been in continuous existence for several generations, they were ob-
viously more reliable repositories of information about what the old law
was than were the memories of old men. At the same time the law
clerks and magistrates began to acquire the status of a guild whose field
of expertise was the old law. They "engrossed" and monopolized the
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law and its "artificial reason," in Coke's happy phrase. They began
to be able to state unaided and with confidence what previous opinions
about the good old law had been.
Gradually the differences which arose among conflicting parties
centered legally on what facts should be used by the law clerks and
magistrates in discovering which one of the previous opinions about the
good old laws was applicable to the case at hand. The reliable determi-
nation of the facts of the case was a precondition to the selection of
the appropriate precedents to resolve the dispute. By helping make
this determination, the jury was converted from judges of the law into
judges of fact. The judge took to himself the old function of saying
what law applied to the facts at issue. In doing this he searched back
through the records of opinions of previous judges, comparing the facts
of earlier opinions with those of the dispute at hand. He knew that
there would not be an exact match between the two sets of facts. But
applying the assumption that earlier opinions were not instances of the
law given concretely, but rather applications of the unwritten law to ear-
lier conditions, he was able to guess how the law would apply to the
present facts. The law was never concrete. The law was never writ-
ten and never fully "discovered." Rather, each judge from case to case
attempted a restatement of the implications of the law for the facts at
hand. The function of the common law judge was similar to that of
an anthropologist studying the legal structure of a primitive culture.
The crucial maneuver lay in the implied hypothesis made by the
judge and by both parties to the dispute. For they implicitly assumed
that there was a "law" (in Coke's case, a "constitution") whose prin-
ciples were discoverable through the evidences of it that lay embedded
in the earlier precedents. However, as the resolution they sought
would apply only to a specific dispute, when that resolution was
found, the opinion which stated it would no more state "the law" than
had the earlier opinions. It would merely resolve the dispute at hand
in accordance with the dictates of the unwritten law. The fundamental
law remained elusive, persisting in back of the culture, holding it up,
but evading conceptual capture by any given judge.
The implicit functional theory of the common law is that it is possible
to analyze any human institution such as a property system or a family
system and finally, even a constitution, into the principles according
to which it functions. These functional principles will exist in the form
of abstract hypotheses as to what must be the behavioral norms-the
common laws-of the institution: the "constitution!' implicit in the
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institution. This projection, feedback process was the way the ancients
invented Natural Law, and it was how the English invented first
common law and later constitutionalism. Through such a process any
conflict arising over a society's implicit constitution can be resolved in
the form of a hypothetical new behavioral norm (a judicial decision)
which states the proposition (the opinion) that the functional principles
underlying the society logically entail following the rule of the instant
decision whenever a situation like that presently at dispute might arise.
Few common law judges may have been aware of going through this
rational process, but this process reveals the constitutional logic im-
plied in their derivation of opinions from precedents. It is the juridi-
cal counterpart of the projection and counter projection feedback proc-
ess that was described earlier.
The logical stages in the production of common law and, ultimately,
of constitutionalism, can now be seen to be similar to the logical stages
previously described for the production of Natural Law. First comes
the projection of the abstract functional principles of institutions
through a deliberative law-trying process. Then there is the counter-
projection, or feedback, of the derived principles back on society in the
form of authoritative standards of behavior. The standards of behav-
ior, as the common law of the constitution, carry the obligation of a
functional ethic stating the behavioral norms that are the logically
entailed operating principles of the social system. But the true func-
tional source of the ethic that validates the laws announced by
judges is not perceived. Moreover, that ethic, though it is en-
forced by the state, does not appear to have been produced-to
have been manufactured-by either the state or its officials. Rather,
the force of constitutional law appears to derive from an ethic that, al-
though announced by, was not invented by human beings. Constitu-
tional law appears to express an autonomous ethic that exists as a higher
law apart from politics, and being a higher law, it can furnish the source
of the validity of the derivative common law opinions that are an-
nounced from time to time by judges sitting on cases and controversies.
Common law judges, especially the most creative and speculative ones
like Justices Coke, Marshall and Cardozo, frequently identified their
most fundamental constitutional opinions with the higher law. Numer-
ous scholars-C. H. Mcflwain and E. S. Corwin are recent exam-
ples43 -have followed this judicial lead. F. W. Maitland avoided
43. See, e.g., E. CoRwm, TAB "HIGHER LAW" BACKoROUND OF AMERICAN CONSn-
TrVTOINA LAw (1955).
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higher law assumptions by refusing to talk about constitutionalism at
all. Instead, he borrowed a surrogate from Otto Gierke: the concept
of the "real personality of the group."44  This permitted him to adopt
a sociological rather than a jurisprudential stance when he dealt with
the trust, the corporation, the corporation sole (one person, such as a
Bishop, considered to be a corporation) and the crown.4 5 As we shall
see later, Gierke's notion was a good lead, up to a point. It helped
account for many of the historical facts about collective legal action and
many arcane features of the medieval English constitution. But this
advantage was purchased at the price of incorporating the mystical no-
tions of geist and real corporate personality into the mundane functional
problems of English law. Legal persons such as corporations and states
can be given empirical juridical existence, that is, a "real" personality,
more simply through the process previously outlined. Here we are
speaking of non-individual roles of actions attributable to legal persons.
This introduces a further facet of constitutionalism-the "rule of law."
E. The Rule of Law and Constitutionalism
The rule of law always has been closely allied to the notion of
Natural Law. It has a very hallowed usage, reaching back beyond the
Middle Ages into classical times. Plato expressed in The Laws one
of man's eternal political quests when he wrote of the search for "the
sacred and golden cord of reason, . the common law of the State
* 40 The rule of law is not the same as Natural Law, for the rule
of law is said to obtain among men on earth while Natural Law is said
to provide a higher foundation for the validity of the rules of human
conduct. A Natural Law interpretation of the rule of law might be to
say that the rule of law is what Natural Law would become if it were
translated into positive law. Plato's summary was:
[W]hen I call the rulers servants or ministers of the law, I give them
this name not for the sake of novelty, but because I certainly believe
that upon such service or ministry depends the well- or ill-being of
the state. For that state in which the law is subject and has no au-
thority, I perceive to be on the highway to ruin; but I see that the state
in which the law is above the rulers, and the rulers are the inferiors of
44. 0. GmRKE, NATURAL LAW AND THM TIEORY OF SOCMTY 1500 TO 1800, at lvii (E.
Barker transl. 1957) [hereinafter cited as GIERKE].
45. See THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FIED.RIC WILLIAM MArrLAND (H. Fisher ed.
1911).
46. 4 THE DiALOGuES OF PLATO 211 (B. Jowett transl. 4th ed. 1953).
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the law, [has salvation,] and ... every blessing which the Gods can
confer.
47
Aristotle added the characteristic amendment that it was not enough
for the state to be merely law abiding. It was not just following the
laws that provided for the rule of law, but following good laws. This
became his basis for distinguishing between the three virtuous forms
of government and their corrupt forms.4 s
Plato's notion was really more naturalistic than was Aristotle's, and
in this matter as in many others, the modern naturalist Francis Bacon
reverted to the Platonic concept in describing the rule of law. To Ba-
con the rule of law is simply the opposite of the rule of violence and
terror.4 9 With Bacon the rule of law begins to approach the modem
Anglo-American notion of due process of law: the traditional proce-
dures and forms that must be followed when actions are taken in the
name of government. The sociologist Gaetano Mosca gave a na-
turalistic interpretation. This was the basis for his notion of "ju-
ridical defense." 50  Mosca argued that regardless of the formal struc-
ture of the state-monarchy, aristocracy or democracy-any state
that had existed over a long period of time found it necessary to
regularize the relationships between the rulers and the ruled. 1 The
ruled had to know what was expected of them, and the rulers had to
know what they could count on. This was not because of any altruism,
but merely so that the business of a political community could get done
and so that the rulers could count on holding their positions with se-
curity. In this sociological view, the rule of law is the deep structure
of the state. It expresses a conservative structural principle that must
ultimately develop in every stable political organization. Here conserv-
atism is used in the same sense as when the biologist states that the
gene structure of an organism represents a conservative principle. A
similar notion is found in those who suggest that in order to survive,
the modem corporation must develop rule of law relationships between
managers and employees: the application of the principles of constitu-
tionalism to internal corporate affairs. Albert Venn Dicey, who car-
ried on the classical liberal idea of constitutionalism, was the most
47. Id. at 285.
48. See F. WoaMuTH, THE ORIGINcS OF MODERN CONSTITTIIONALISM 10-25 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as WoxMtrri].
49. 9 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 313 (J. Spedding, R. Ellis & D. Heath ed. 1854)
[hereinafter cited as WoRKs].
50. MoscA, supra note 6, at 120.
51. Id. passim.
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eloquent of those who identified the rule of law with constitution-
alism.52  A more recent expression of this position is found in
Frederic A. Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty.
In all of these instances, there is implied a viewpoint similar to that
of medieval English folk law. It is assumed that the substance and the
content of what will be done is intrinsically just; all that is required is
to regularize the procedures through which authorities act.
If a pre-existing social organization is assumed to be valid, or if the
principles of valid social organization are assumed to be pre-existent,
like the rate of acceleration of falling bodies, these principles need only
be discovered and applied, they need not be validated. All that is re-
quired is a process of discovery which can be shown to be procedurally
valid. There is no fundamental difference between the higher law tra-
dition of medieval English common law and the rule of law tradition
of neo-classical liberalism. Both were attempts to spell out the func-
tional ethic implicit in a given social system, and both were equally
accurate and scientific, from a structuralist point of view. Both
approaches revealed the systemic juridical implications of social orders
that were taken as "given." Professor Hayek's impressive book prob-
ably should have been called "The Constitution of Liberalism," for
what he did, with great theoretical elegance, was to construct an
abstract model of a liberal culture and then trace out its implicit ethical
norms, stating them abstractly in the form of the functional juridical
principles which comprise the constitutional prerequisites for such a cul-
ture: an abstraction of the constitutional implications of a given
(liberal) social system. Similarly, the 12th century jurist Glanvill, in
writing the first textbook of English law,53 produced an abstraction of
the constitutional implications of the way his own society worked. Both
resulted in abstract legal models of a social system. Each model, in
turn, could be subjected to a functional analysis; each juridical model
could be inspected to find out what were its implicit prescriptive norms.
The result-the prescriptive norms implicit, for example, in Glanvill's
model-could be called "medieval constitutionalism." This, in effect,
was the task to which Professor McIlwain devoted much of his life and
which he summarized in the book Constitutionalism, Ancient and
Modern. Constitutional theory requires just this sort of work. It con-
sists of deriving the functional prescriptions implicit in abstract models
derived from social systems. The models may also be prospective, as
52. DICEY, supra note 3.
53. R. GLANVILL, TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ANGLIAB (1187-1189).
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in the constitution-making done by the founders of the American
Constitution. Constitutional theory amounts to the implicit final causes
of a social system-the constitutional behavior that must take place in
order for it to function properly.
Hence, as in Philadelphia in 1787, it is possible to invent rather than
merely to discover constitutional principles. Natural Law discovered
the prescriptive implications of going institutions. Although it involved
a rational process, the institutions from which it worked had developed
non-rationally. We may paraphrase Aristotle's criticism of Plato's
notion of the rule of law in this connection. Aristotle had said that
the rule of law was not merely following the law, but rather following
good laws. And we may add that it is not only deriving the prescriptive
implications of going institutions that provides sound projections, but
also deriving the prescriptive implications of more rational possible
institutions. The greater validity of such invented prescriptions does
not rest upon the ethical fiat attached to them but upon the fact that
they better describe the "necessary relations arising from the nature"
of the society. Ethical fiat and Natural Law are constitutionalism in its
"utopian" stage-as it has been said that medieval astrology and al-
chemy were astronomy and chemistry in their utopian stages. Ethical
fiat is attached to a functional prescription when it cannot be proven-
as was attempted in the Federalist Papers-to be a necessary final
cause. It is an attempt to short circuit the process of proving the neces-
sary implications of a given system of relationships much as magic short
circuited the process of uncovering causal relationships. The only
validity constitutionalism can have is functional validity. Each of the
conventions of the "unwritten" British Constitution can be shown to
have been derived in the same way that the ordinary English judge de-
rived the everyday principles of the "unwritten" common law. Both
are instances of the rule of law, and both are instances of efforts to
describe the prescriptive implications of the necessary relations arising
from the nature of the social institutions specific to England at a given
time. As we shall see later, the same process was at work in the
"invention" of the American Constitution.
One of the most important conventions of the British Constitution is
the principle that the opposition party does not precipitate a govern-
ment crisis unless it is able and prepared to accept the responsibility
to form a new government. This convention is stated in the form of
a prescription. But it is not an ethical prescription; it is a functional
prescription. British parliamentary institutions would not work if this
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prescription were not observed. After World War II, the West Ger-
mans were so persuaded of the functional necessity of this prescription
that they wrote it into their new constitution. Its importance to German
constitutionalism derives not from its being in their Basic Law but in
the fact that it is a sound functional prescription implicit in the opera-
tion of a specific political system.
There are several modes of projection that aid in deriving functional
prescriptions that are subject to analytical verification. For any pro-
posed rule of action its long-run implications may be different from its
short-run implications. The long-run qualification of the proposed rule
of action may be revealed by projecting it through time, space, function
and structure. For any given rule of action its universal implications
may be different from its particular implications. These, as Kant indi-
cated, may be seen by generalizing it for all men. For any given action
its intrinsic implications may be different from its extrinsic implications.
These may be seen by measuring its degree of concatenation with other
actions also required by the social system.
Systemic functional prescriptions are like the conventions of the
British Constitution. They are properties of the overall social system
rather than of its individual components. Certain types of actions will
be functional requirements of the system.
These modes of projection are the formal procedures out of which
constitutional theory is derived. It exists in the form of hypothetical
quasi-symbolic behavioral norms. On the theoretical level its validity
may be formal, but the test of validity will be the extent to which func-
tion necessity can be proved in theory-the extent to which they are
the axiomatic properties of a projected social system. This is a short-
hand expression of what occurred, or what was summarized, in the Phil-
adelphia Constitutional Convention and in the Federalist Papers that
followed. This will be returned to later in the discussion of how
American Constitutionalism was invented. First, however, the demo-
cratic component of constitutionalism must be addressed. This is con-
stitutionalism seen as the institutionalization of civil disobedience.
II. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE
A. Introduction
Even before the 13th century, England's kings had encountered dis-
obedient baronial uprisings. As we look back on them it is hard to
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know which side had the greater claim on justice. Did the common
people fare better when the great barons held the king in check? Or
did that check on royal authority merely permit the barons to behave
more despotically at home toward their own subordinates? But if we
restrict our concern to the relationships between king and barons alone,
the issue is clearer. The barons resorted to civil disobedience in
resistance to royal despotism.
The feudal period was a millennium of institutionalized cold war:
Church against State, State against State, and Church against Church.
The principals themselves-popes and kings-seldom fought against
each other directly. Rather, they deployed their forces as players at
chess. The "pieces" were cities, baronies, provinces and marcher
states; the gambits were alliances, dynastic marriages and ultimately
armed confrontation, which usually involved employment of a floating
population of mercenaries; those armed entrepreneurs of feudal war-
fare who flourished until the 15th century when royal gunpowder blew
rebellious barons out of their adulterine (unauthorized) casties. Four
hundred years of chessboard feuding produced not only chivalry and
"rules of war," but also typical patterns of conflict resolution. Chief
among these was a special form of peace treaty with which internal
baronial struggles were brought to a close. Here the prime example
was the Magna Carta of Runnymede that was forced upon King John
in 1215. For the ensuing four and a half centuries, it was successively
royally abrogated and baronially reinstated-and then amended, ex-
tended and amplified-so often, indeed, that social compacts and char-
ters of liberties became a way of life and thought natural to English-
men.
Of ancillary importance was an even more frequent form of conflict
resolution: the deposition, and sometimes the beheading, of the king's
chief ministers, even when it was the king himself who was the real
target of the uprising.
The result was that rebellions, successful ones, that is, by ending with
written charters and ministerial depositions, tended to induce English-
men to think of kingship (not yet "sovereignty") and the "crown" as
a regal field of force out of which power could be produced and con-
trolled. The control devices were charters which expressed immemo-
rial rights and laws; their observance was insured by ministerial deposi-
tion.
But the ultimate control of the barons was their readiness and ability
to resort to violence. Hence, the resort to violence, the rule of
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law, and ministerial dismissal came to be the three features that
characterized the deep structure of medieval English kingship. Grad-
ually, as Maitland pointed out, the "crown" came to be thought of more
as a political institution than a bejewelled chattel residing in the Tower
of London, and of the king who possessed it as the one who for the
moment exercised that institutionalization of majesty. From this
standpoint the "crown" was a set of rules and roles, and the "king' was
their personalization-their anthropomorphic embodiment-not the
other way around. Hence, the maxim that "king could do no wrong."
At first this meant, in effect, at least he'd better not or he'd get his
come-uppance. But ultimately it meant, in addition, that he was, in
principle (we would say constitutionally), unable to do wrong.
If wrongdoing occurred, it was attributed to the human administra-
tive fallibility of the person who happened to possess the crown and
the officers through whom he acted rather than to a defect inherent
in the crown itself. As the functions of the crown expanded and as
the corps of royal officials grew, nearly all actions bearing the royal seal
were actually done by crown ministers. Then the doctrine that the king
could do no wrong was extended to mean that any wrongdoing in his
name was the result not of his own fallibility but of bad advice by his
ministers. Grievances that led to civil disobedience still targeted upon
the King and his armed supporters as their immediate object, but the
remedy was the supplantation (initially the execution) of his errant
ministers. These countervailing processes remained tinged with vio-
lence well into the 16th century. At that time, however, the Tudors
were able to deploy cannon against castles and effectively "nationalize"
the means of baronial violence. Exploitation of the technological ad-
vantage inherent in gunpowder led to the long period of constitutional
stalemate we know, somewhat erroneously, as "Tudor absolutism."
However, institutional development was not stalled. Indeed, the ulti-
mate effect was to institutionalize precisely those forms of civil
disobedience that had been earlier pioneered and later virtually
ritualized-baronial uprisings were transplanted first into parliamentary
obstructionism and later into "His Majesty's loyal opposition"; the
imposition of chartered rights was transformed into justiciable common
pleas; ministerial deposition was translated into impeachment.
All this first came to a head under James I, and the process of transi-
tion is best symbolized by the enmity between James and Parliament
on the one hand and Justice Edward Coke and Chancellor Francis
Bacon on the other. Full institutionalization was to be nearly a century
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in the future, but already with the impeachment of Bacon in 1621 and
the Petition of Right in 1628, the twin foundations of British constitu-
tionalism, the rule of law and impeachment, were in place. Moreover,
at that early stage we can still observe lurking just behind these nascent
devices the medieval rebellions from which they had sprung. And we
can see as well their structural identity with civil disobedience: consti-
tutionalism as the institutionalization of civil disobedience.
So much for the preliminary statement of the thesis; what of the evi-
dence? A simple chronological catalogue of events will suffice.5
4
B. Civil Disobedience in English Kingship
Arms were relatively cheap. War was entrepreneurial. As a result,
violence was always a close cousin to kingship. The pattern of the
future had been set even before Magna Carta. William the Con-
queror's successor, William (Rufus) II, was beset frequently by
rebellion. After William I's death in a hunting accident, his brother
became the first of a long line of crown snatchers and acceded to the
throne as Henry I. Stephen followed suit, but as king he reaped chiefly
a civil war for his pains. Its conclusion found the great barons, acting
as power brokers, mediating the terms on which royal power would be
exercised. For enforcement they could rely upon armed bands that
could be called up promptly from thousands of "castles." These were
mostly crude earthen work and wooden constructions from which armed
men conducted their excursions. The chronicle of the times states:
'Every shire was full of castles and every castle filled with devils and
evil men."5 5  The chronicler added that the people moaned that
"Christ and his saints slept."586
Henry II was besieged by rambunctious Church magnates as well as
lay barons. The Constitutions of Clarendon asserted lay primacy for
a while, but after the murder of Thomas Becket, Henry was brought
to his knees. Two rebellions were mounted by his own sons under the
pretext of bridling the king's excesses.
Richard (lion-hearted) I, while away at the Crusades, was under-
mined by Prince John, his brother, who deposed the King's chancellor
and struck, unsuccessfully, for the throne during Richard's captivity in
Europe. The authorized ministers resisted, however, and kept power
54. See 5-8 CAwmRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY (1926-36).
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effectively in their own hands. Next, "bad king John," of Magna Carta
(1215) fame, was humbled first by the Church and then by the barons
at Runnymede. Magna Carta was more than merely another gathering
of boisterous barons. They had both force and, under the impetus of
the prelate, Stephen Langton, a program. This transformed what
otherwise might have been an historically commonplace event into a
momentous event.
The fact that Magna Carta contains the classic statement of the rights
and liberties of all Englishmen is well known. Less familiar is Chapter
61 describing the "form of security." This provided for a council of
25 who were to be the guardians of the charter. In the event of an
infringement the matter could be brought to royal attention by 4 of the
25. If correction did not occur within 40 days, the committee of 4 was
empowered to convene a full meeting of the council of 25 to put things
right. The 25, with the community of the whole realm, agreed King
John, "shall distrain and trouble us in all possible ways by taking our
castles, lands, possessions." 5  Edmund Burke, who is not generally
classed among the Whig historians, summarized Magna Carta by saying
that "if it did not give us originally the House of Commons, gave us
at least a House of Commons of weight and consequence.""8
Whether or not this was the true beginning of the Commons is
irrelevant; it provided the pattern for a series of authority struggles that
studded every decade of medieval English history. And until the 16th
century Tudor consolidation of royal power, a large proportion of the
medieval anti-royal revolts were successful, and most of those were con-
summated with concessions extracted from a disciplined King who was
forced to agree in writing to follow certain stipulated practices, to
appoint special crown councillors named by the rebels, to dismiss hated
officials and to rule only through regular assemblies. King John tried
to ignore Magna Carta and, just before his death, he was faced with an-
other civil war formed around Prince Louis (of France) as well as the
rebellious English barons.
The regents of young Henry III (aged 9) re-issued the charter and
put the barons down for a while. Later, however, the chancellor was
driven from office at the "Mad Parliament" and the "Provisions of Ox-
ford" adopted. These placed the government under three cumber-
some committees of barons and bishops. They, in their turn, however,
were confronted by a baronial counter force and required to grant the
57. MAGNA CARTA art. 61. See W. WARREN, KING JoiN 276 (1961).
58. 2 THE WarriNs AN SPEECHES oF FDMUND BuKEX (1901).
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"Provisions of Westminister." When Henry persuaded the Pope to
rescind these, the barons again rebelled, extorted from the captive king
the "Mise of Lewes" and called "Montforfs Parliament 1265" to re-
store matters and hold the king in ward. Prince Edward, however,
destroyed Montfort, extricated the king at the Battle of Evesham, and
shortly thereafter became the first king in English history to ascend the
throne without some form of election.
Edward, whose motto was pactum serva, "Keep Troth," as it was
translated, introduced many constitutional innovations which strength-
ened the crown by regularizing royal administration procedures. Gae-
tano Mosca's principle of "juridical defence" could have been de-
rived from the effects of that reign. To finance a two-front war, King
Edward summoned the "Model Parliament" (1295) "because that
which touches all should be approved of all." 59 This was patterned
after Montfort's parliament and included burghers, as well as knights
and clergy, and did indeed become the model for the future. But as
fighting became costlier, the baronage and the clergy became more par-
simonious. Edward's new prerogative tax, the "mal tolt," was resisted
and rebellion spread. Shortly he was forced to accede to a parliamen-
tary petition which took control over taxation away from the curia regis
and placed it in the assembly.
Edward H ran into domestic troubles immediately over his impolitic
choice (Pierr Gaveston) for chief councillor. During the ensuing
struggles Gaveston was shuttled in and out of office. Under Edward's
cousin Thomas, Earl of Lancaster, the barons (1311) again brought
the king to heel and placed Edward on a £10 per day allowance.
Soon, however, it was Lancaster's turn, and (1318) a baronial faction
removed him and set up a new council. Edward then turned to two
ambitious magnates, the Despensers, who quickly discharged the ruling
barons, only to court their own dismissal and exile at the hands of the
armed and resurgent barons in the Parliament of 1321. The next year,
when Edward tried to reinstate the Despensers, the Lancastrian faction
rebelled but Edward defeated Thomas and beheaded him on the spot
(Boroughbridge). This effected a near martyrdom for Lancaster and
the enmity of his wife, Isabella. She joined the Lancastrian party, de-
posed and then killed the king and elevated the young Edward III to
the throne. He, however, expelled his mother's partner, Mortimer,
called a Parliament and avenged his father's murder.
The Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) had prominent institutional
59. L. SALzMAN, EDwARD I, at 211 (1968).
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effects; it was so expensive, kings were forced to trade parliamentary
concessions for money. Edward actually went bankrupt in 1345 and
his repudiation of debts ruined several great Italian banking houses.
The Black Death (1348-49) depopulated the nation, struck selectively
against the poor, and inaugurated an economic revolution that ulti-
mately displaced the feudal serfs with yeoman farmers, but not without
a series of agrarian riots. This was also the town building era,
stimulated by the growth of the weaving trades and the appearance of
the merchant princes. Social mobility became quite rapid. The Poles
of Hull rose from tradesmen to dukes in three generations.
Reverses in France led to strife at home, and demands that Lan-
caster be removed from office. John Wycliffe joined forces with John
of Gaunt, leading to the "Good Parliament" of 1376. Again, the pat-
tern of the past was repeated. The King's ministers were accused
of corruption and deposed, and then the King was forced to accept a
council of 12 peers with authority reminiscent of the "lord's ordainers"
that had been placed over his father. Afterward, however, Lancaster's
response was to pull off something like a coup d'etat. He released the
deposed ministers, dismissed the council of 12, and declared the stat-
utes of the Good Parliament null and void.
After the accession of Richard II, a new Parliament returned to the
work of 1376 and turned out the Lancastrians. The young Richard
was made to agree that "no act of parliament can be repealed save with
parliament's consent." 60  However, the new government ran into
troubles of its own and these issued in the "Great Revolt of 1381,"
ostensibly to repeal the poll tax that had been instituted the year be-
fore. The insurgents flooded to London from rural bases led by the
"mad priest of Kent," John Bull. They denounced the barons as
"traitors," and chanted the radical refrain:
"When Adam delved and Eve span
Who was then the gentleman?" ' 1
They demanded all differences of rank, status and property be
abolished. Soon Wat Tyler emerged as their organizer, and the move-
ment assumed "modern" revolutionary characteristics, combining mili-
tary organization with an equalitarian ideology. Tyler stormed London
and forced the young king to appear at the parley of Mile End. But
the rebellion was quelled with a single stroke: The Mayor of London
60. C. OMAN, THE GREAT REVOLT OF 1381, at 150 (1961).
61. The phrase acquired currency some decades earlier. See P. LnRDSAY & R.
GRovEs, TnE PAsANT's REVOLT 1381, at 61 (1974).
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surprised Tyler and cutlassed him to death on the spot. A new Parlia-
ment quickly revoked the concessions of Mile End, adding that no grant
of privileges could be valid without the "consent of the Estates of the
Realm."
Before long, however, Richard himself had provoked the barons.
They banished his chief ministers, declared themselves "lords appel-
lant" and proceeded to charge the King's former ministers with treason.
The king's meager forces were routed at Rodcot Bridge (1387), and
Richard was placed under the control of a council of ministers. How-
ever, 10 years later, a mature Richard struck back and in a coup d'etat
took his revenge. He routed the barons, intimidated Parliament and
gathered power into his own hands. By the end of the century,
however, armed opposition forced him to declare himself "insufficient
and useless" and to abdicate.
The throne, having been declared vacant, was next occupied by
Henry IV, who, being, in effect, an elected king, appeared to sanction
the doctrine that kings could be deposed for incapacity and maladminis-
tration. Even so, he was soon confronted with the abortive "rebellion
of the earls," which ended his taste for being a "lawful king." Rebel-
lion and rioting became endemic, in part abetted by the Lollards, and
the court split into two implacable factions which his successor, Henry
V, was able to avoid only through excursions in France.
Henry VI, an infant king, was the pawn of contending would-be
regents, whose squabbles ultimately resulted in the impeachment of
Suffolk, and this was followed by Jack ("John Amend-all") Cade's
rebellion. The eve of the War of the Roses (1453-1497) was at hand.
Strokes and counter-strokes became commonplace, and while the
lords killed each other off, the common people prospered. By the be-
ginning of the 16th century, the age of baronial countervailing violence
was brought to a close by the advent of Henry VII, the first of the
Tudors. Henry, unsteady at first, gradually consolidated royal power,
outlawed baronial entrepreneurial warfare and deferred royal account-
ability tenuously to the 17th century when new models of popular
opposition, abetted by new model armies, ushered in the series of con-
stitutional struggles that led to our own era.
To the extent it did anything, the medieval English Constitution can
be said to have institutionalized civil disobedience. As doctrinal ration-
alizations of baronial insurrections became perfected, the opposing
sides came to recognize that there were two distinct realms of royal au-
thority. One dealt with extraordinary situations such as foreign
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relations and war making. Here the king was supreme. The other
dealt with the settled law of the land governing domestic feudal rela-
tionships. In this area the king was under the law. However, it was
not always easy to tell whether a given royal act fell under the one or
the other. And in the event of a dispute, who was to decide the
matter? There was no principle of judicial review under which a con-
stitutional challenge could be taken to a high court for resolution. On
the contrary, the High Court of Parliament was the king's court. The
justices and law clerks were crown appointees and might be counted
on to rule in the king's favor. Thus those early disputes were something
like the ones that arise today between labor and management. If a
dispute between king and barons could not be settled by negotiation,
the only recourse open to the barons was to strike against the king,
which they frequently did. But to attack the principle of royalty was
hazardous, even when done in the name of the law. For one thing,
the authority of the barons toward their own vassals rested upon the
same principle of allegiance as did the king's authority over the barons.
To threaten the higher jeopardized the lower. Accordingly, it became
a maxim among the barons that their disobedience was not a violation
of their personal loyalty to the king, nor did they claim that allegiance
was more owing to the laws than to the king, a doctrine incompatible
with kingship. Instead they developed the doctrine of the king's
wicked advisers. According to this doctrine, it was not the king himself
who was at fault if wrong was done; rather it was held that the king
could do no wrong. If wrong occurred, it was because the king
was the victim of wicked advisers. The barons could then oppose the
policies of evil councillors without seeming to challenge the principles
of kingly authority itself. Wicked advisers had to be purged, they
argued, to insure that the king's proper will could find expression.
Gradually, over many centuries, this form of baronial civil disobedience
became institutionalized in Parliament through impeachment proceed-
ings against errant ministers of the Crown. This, in turn, led to the
emergence of the working principles of the British Constitution-the
principle that the king acts only on the advice of his ministers; the prin-
ciple that the ministers of the king's cabinet are responsible to Parlia-
ment for acts done in the name of the Crown; and the principle that
a Cabinet must resign if it loses the confidence of Parliament. Mdil-
wain indicates that British constitutionalism is little more than the insti-
tutionalization of civil disobedience."2
62. McILwAmN, supra note 2, at 374-75.
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C. Civil Disobedience in the Early Republic
This is all very well for a monarchy, but how does one translate these
principles to make sure they will operate in a democratic republic?
How can there be wicked advisers in such a democracy? Advisers to
whom? To the President? No, because loyalty is not owing to the
President, only to the nation itself. Our pledge of allegiance is "to the
flag and to the republic for which it stands." In a republic the nation
itself takes the place once held by monarchs. A republican version of
the doctrine of evil counsel can apply only if, as in Nazi Germany, a
nation's official administration becomes tyrannical. So in a democracy
the administration takes the place of the king's wicked advisers, which
is what happened under the administration of Richard Nixon. This is
also the way despotism is described in the collectivist democracies.
Despotism in a constitutional republic occurs when an errant adminis-
tration "gives evil counsel," so to speak, to the government. But how
does one impeach an administration? Quadrennial elections might pro-
vide a partial solution if the opposing parties could make the election
a referendum on the incumbent administration. While this sometimes
occurs, it seldom works effectively due to the vast assortments of con-
flicting interests and pressures at work in each of our major parties.
This has led political scientists to describe them as parties of compro-
mise rather than principle, a factor that frustrates the possibility of
making an election a clear referendum on the incumbent administra-
tion. Constitutional history shows that constitutionalism is not safe
unless individuals are secure in their right to defend it through acts of
civil disobedience. The tradition of civil disobedience must find vitality
through devices for opposing and checking oppressive actions by the
ruling administration. This is not as paradoxical as it may at first seem.
It was not too far back that the English doctrine of His Majesty's
"loyal" opposition was also deemed self-contradictory, for how could
one who opposed the King be considered loyal? Closer to home, we
can recall that John Brown's insurrection opened the door to many of
our own contemporary doctrines of civil liberties. Two of America's
major contributions to political theory, Thoreau's Civil Disobedience
and Calhoun's Discourses, were devoted to the philosophical and con-
stitutional foundations of civil disobedience. The Constitution of
Massachusetts explicitly protects the "right" to revolution. The Ameri-
can Constitution itself is founded on this right, and John Locke, whose
doctrines were studied carefully by our Founding Fathers, was history's
chief theoretician of the right to revolution. Locke argued that the
[Vol. 8
1975] THE FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 549
civil liberty, in the end, rests upon two rights: to revolt or to seek
refuge from oppression in "vacuus locus. ' 63 Otherwise, Locke argued,
no constitution is proof against tyranny. All this is well known, and
yet there remains in our minds a seeming contradiction between the
government's need to rule and the obvious necessity for citizens to
resist tyranny.
A beginning, but only a beginning, was made by the framers of the
American Constitution. They themselves had just carried through a
successful act of civil disobedience. As with their baronial precursors,
they had first stated their case in the name of their allegiance to the
person of the king, claiming that Parliament had taxed them in viola-
tion of the British Constitution. The historical evidence shows that
these ideas were thoroughly discussed in the colonies prior to the out-
break of the War of Independence.6" Civil disobedience and the
doctrine of the king's wicked advisers were central colonial issues. Had
there been a way for England to acknowledge a privileged constitu-
tional status for colonial civil disobedience, the War of Independence
might never have occurred. However, there was no way for that to
happen.
In certain imperial disputes appeal lay to the law lords-the
high justices who sat in the House of Lords, but this concerned only
colonial matters, such as disputes between colonists and the Governor
General. There was no way to appeal a Parliamentary enactment even
though cases dating from before the victory of the parliamentary forces
in 1688 indicated that enactments of the English parliament might not
have the force of law inside the colonies. This was what the colonists
claimed, and constitutional historians have not yet resolved the debate.
The colonists, citing the English doctrine that the king can do no wrong
(wrongful acts of the crown being attributed to the King's wicked min-
isters) justified their opposition in accordance with the English tradition
of civil disobedience. But this required the ability to impeach errant
ministers, which was obviously impossible for colonists to do. It was
necessary to find an alternative target as the object of colonial civil dis-
obedience, namely the parliamentary decrees themselves-civil dis-
obedience as the impeachment of an objectionable law rather than an
errant minister. But while it was easy to see how ministers might be
in error, how could a law be at fault, especially in England where Par-
63. 1. LocxE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 183 (1956 ed.).
64. See B. BALYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 55
(1967).
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liament was sovereign? This was the constitutional issue of the
American Revolution, for the Americans, in visualizing a way to institu-
tionalize their own form of civil disobedience, first had to create a sov-
ereign British Constitution so they could put forward the concept of un-
constitutionality. Then civil disobedience, by analogy with the English
past, was valid when directed against "unconstitutional" law. But this
doctrine was unintelligible to 18th century English parliamentarians.
How could such an issue be adjudicated? Parliament was sovereign.
No other body could declare its acts unconstitutional.
Not so, replied the colonists, for they were doing so and they cited
the ancient law cases in their behalf. But the English merely replied
by stating what the law was. And the law, as Parliament definitively
announced it, demanded colonial compliance. Obviously, something
more was required, and that something was one of three things: capitu-
lation by one of the parties, war, or some institutionalized device for
adjudicating such disputes. Both rejected the first, and lacking the
third, only war remained. But the dilemma persisted, and following
the war, the Americans returned to its solution: the invention of judi-
cial review. Civil disobedience could be institutionalized on the level
of statutes as well as ministers if a way could be found to impeach them.
This was how the American revolutionaries contributed a special
cluster of concepts to constitutionalism: a sovereign hypostatized Con-
stitution, unconstitutionality, an autonomous Supreme Court and the
judicial review of the constitutionality of impeached governmental or
legislative acts. This inaugurated the institutionalization of civil dis.
obedience on an entirely new constitutional plane. Such inventions are
rare historical occasions, and it is worthwhile to inspect the writings of
one of those who participated in that invention. As with all significant
social inventions, the tributaries that fed its emergence are numerous
and arise from several different sources. But civil disobedience was
one of the cornerstones of the characteristic features of American con-
stitutionalism. With Watergate, and the suppression of civil disobedi-
ence it symbolized scarcely behind us, this lesson requires sturdy rein-
forcement. The passage that follows is taken from the closing
paragraphs of James Wilson's "Speech Delivered in the Convention For
the Province of Pennsylvania" (January, 1775):
And now, sir, let me appeal to the impartial tribunal of reason and
truth-let me appeal to every unprejudiced and judicious observer of
the laws of Britain, and of the Constitution of the British government-
let me appeal, I say, whether -the principles on which I argue, or the
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principles on which alone my arguments can be opposed, are those which
ought to be adhered to and acted upon-which of them are most con-
sonant to our laws and liberties-which of them have the strongest, and
are likely to have the most effectual, tendency to establish and secure
the royal power and dignity.
Are we deficient in loyalty to his majesty? Let our conduct convict,
for it will fully convict, the insinuation, that we are, of falsehood. Our
loyalty has always appeared in the true form of loyalty-in obeying our
sovereign according to law: let those, who would require it in any other
form, know, that we call the persons who execute his commands, when
contrary to law, disloyal and traitors. Are we enemies to the power of
the crown? No, sir: we are its best friends: this friendship prompts
us to wish, that the power of the crown may be firmly established on
the most solid basis: but we know, that the constitution alone will per-
petuate the former, and securely uphold the latter. Are our principles
irreverent to majesty? They are quite reverse: we ascribe to it perfec-
tion, almost divine. We say, that the king can do no-wrong: we say,
that to do wrong is the property, not of power, but of weakness. We
feel oppression; and will oppose it; but we know-for our constitution
tells us-that oppression can never spring from the -throne. We
must, therefore, search elsewhere for its source: our infallible guide
will direct us to it. Our constitution tells us, that all oppression
springs from the ministers of the throne. The attributes of perfection,
ascribed to the king, are, neither by the constitution, nor in fact, com-
municable to his ministers. They may do wrong: they have often done
wrong: they have been often punished for doing wrong.
Here we may discern the true cause of all the impudent clamour and
unsupported accusations of the ministers and of their minions, that have
been raised and made against the conduct of the Americans. Those
ministers and minions are sensible, that the opposition is directed, not
against his majesty, but against them: because they have abused his
majesty's confidence, brought discredit upon his government, and dero-
gated from his justice. They see the publick vengeance collected in
dark clouds around them: their consciences tell them, that it should be
hurled, like a thunder bolt, at their guilty heads. Appalled with guilt
and fear, they skulk behind the throne. Is it disrespectful to drag -them
into publick view, and make a distinction between them and his majesty,
under whose venerable name they daringly attempt to shelter their
crimes? Nothing can more effectually contribute to establish his
majesty on the throne, and to secure to him the affections of his people,
than this distinction. By it we are taught to consider all the blessings
of government as flowing from the throne; and to consider every
instance of oppression as proceeding, which in truth is oftenest the case,
from the ministers.
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If, now, it is true, that all force employed for the purposes so often
mentioned, is force unwarranted by any act of parliament; unsupported
by any principle of the common law; unauthorized by any commission
from the crown-that, instead of being employed for the support of the
constitution and his majesty's government, it must be employed for the
support of oppression and ministerial tyranny-if all this is true-and
I flatter myself it appears to be true-can any one hesitate to say, that
to resist such force is lawful: and that both the letter and the spirit of
the British constitution justify such resistance?
Resistance, both by the letter and the spirit of the British constitution,
may be carried farther, when necessity requires it, than I have carried
it. Many examples in the English history might be adduced, and many
authorities of the greatest weight might be brought, to show, that when
the king, forgetting his character and dignity, has stepped forth, and
openly avowed and taken a part in such iniquitous conduct as has been
described; in such cases, indeed, the distinction above mentioned, wisely
made by the constitution for the security of the crown, could not be ap-
plied; because the crown had unconstitutionally rendered the application
of it impossible. What has been the consequence? The distinction be-
tween him and his ministers has been lost: but they have not been
raised to his situation: he has sunk to theirs.05
Let us briefly recapitulate what Wilson said. First he invoked
reason as the basis of an "appeal" to Britain's laws and constitution.
Such principles, he said, were consonant with "our laws and liberties,"
which also "establish and secure royal power and dignity." True
loyalty consists of obeying the sovereign "according to law," and to re-
quire it in any other form would actually be disloyalty. This perfec-
tionist conception of the constitution makes the king's majesty equally
perfect, for the two must be identical in order to validate the doctrine
that the king can do no wrong. Hence oppression must be opposed
because oppression "can never spring from the throne,": "[o]ur con-
stitution tells us, that all oppression springs from the ministers of the
throne[,J" and they do not partake of the king's immunity from wrong-
doing.
Evil ministers cannot be permitted to use the crown as a shield for
wrongdoing. The constitution requires that they be unveiled. Any
force they use to perpetrate evil can be opposed, and to do so is constitu-
tional.
Of course, if the king himself were to violate the constitution and
join the forces of evil, that would be unconstitutional because it would
65. 2 Tim WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 757-58 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967) (footnote
omitted).
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invalidate the distinction between a perfect kingship and imperfect
ministers. This would also undermine the institutionalized civil dis-
obedience that derived from impeachment. In that case, of course,
civil disobedience against the king himself would be constitutionally
protected.
Protected by whom or by what? In order to defend civil dis-
obedience carried to such a length, Wilson had to appeal to a constitu-
tion standing above both ministers and king. This new hypostatized
constitution would have to limit all unconstitutional governmental acts
because unconstitutional acts by a king could not be punished under the
English principle that the king acts only through his ministers who are
responsible solely to Parliament. Hence, the only form of civil dis-
obedience that remained open to the colonists was outright rebellion.
And while they heartily adopted this option vis-4-vis England, they tried
to forestall the need for its repetition in their own new government by
constitutionalizing a new world form of civil disobedience. This, as was
quickly apparent, required the institution of the principle of judicial re-
view. Otherwise there would be no reliable way to enforce the
supremacy of the Constitution when the head of the government was
at fault. Other forces led toward the same end, but the initial role of
civil disobedience in shaping American constitutionalism must be
accorded prime significance.
Despite the differences, the institutionalization of civil disobedience
in both England and America was stimulated by the success of oligar-
chical forms of civil disobedience. Eighteenth century constitutionalism
was the institutionalization of elitist, not mass, civil disobedience. The
American Constitution tried to prevent the national legislature from ad-
versely affecting the interests of local elites. This was provided for in
the grant of legislative power and also through federalism. Hamilton,
who privately advocated greater centralization than was provided for
in the Constitution, attempted to assuage the fears of those who thought
the new system gave too much power to the national government by
arguing that the states would never permit the central power to be mis-
used. The states would monopolize the ordinary administration of
criminal and civil justice and
[tihis great cement of society, which will diffuse itself almost wholly
through the channels of the particular governments, independent of all
other causes of influence, would insure so decided an empire over their
respective citizens as to render them at all times a complete counter-
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poise, and, not unfrequently, dangerous rivals to the power of the
Union." 66
Hamilton here was stating his own fears as reassurances to his oppo-
nents. It proved more prophetic than he would have bargained for.
Madison, as might be expected, gave an even more explicit rationale
of state-based civil disobedience, using arguments that later were sys-
tematized by Calhoun:
[S]hould an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be un-
popular in particular States ... the means of opposition to it are
powerful and at hand. . . . A correspondence would be opened.
Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate and
conduct the whole. The same combinations, in short, would result from
an apprehension of the federal, as was produced by the dread of a
foreign, yoke; and unless the projected innovations should be volun-
tarily renounced, -the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in
the one case as was made in the other .. . . [T]he existence of sub-
ordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by
which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the
enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple
government of any form can admit of . . . . Either the mode in
which the federal government is to be constructed will render it suffi-
ciently dependent on the people, or it will not. On the first supposi-
tion, it will be restrained by that dependence from forming schemes
obnoxious to their constituents. On the other supposition, it will not
possess the confidence of the people, and its schemes of usurpation will
be easily defeated by the State governments, who will be supported by
the people.6
7
This proved to be an uncanny forecast of Jefferson's "political revolu-
tion" of 1800.68
Initially, federalism was the doctrine that citizens possessed dual
citizenship and allegiance. One was to their state and its laws, the
other was to the central government. Clearly, this was an effort to
institutionalize, inside the new government, protections against the
kinds of despotism that the English parliament had visited on the
colonies. States rights, interposition and secession were the ultimate
guarantors. This constitutional theory of federalism as the institution-
66. Tim FEDERALisT No. 17, at 120 (New American Lib. ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)
[hereinafter cited as Tm FEDERALIST]. See also Tan FEDERALIST No. 84, at 516: "The
executive and legislative bodies of each State will be so many sentinels over the persons
employed in every department of the national administration.. .."
67. Tim FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 66, at 297-300 (J. Madison).
68. D. SISSON, THE AMmRICAN REvoLuTION OF 1800 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
SISSON].
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alization of civil disobedience was later explained by John C. Calhoun.
While federalism could not be called the institutionalization of
popular civil disobedience, it was the primary device the Founding
Fathers used to prevent the recurrence of what they had rebelled
against. It was utilized on a minor scale several times but foundered
over the slavery issue. Finally, the tie between federalism and civil
disobedience was eliminated as a result of the Civil War. Seen in this
light only, the Civil War had a deconstitutionalizing effect. We have
now explored the anthropological and historical sources for constitu-
tionalism's twin ingredients, the rule of law and institutionalized civil
disobedience. Before applying these lessons to our present constitu-
tional crisis it will be helpful to investigate the contemporary debate
over constitutionalism. For, as we shall see, there are two schools of
interpretation. Neither gives proper recognition to the two ingredients
of constitutionalism explored here. One, the "Anglicans," thinks too
little should be done. But the other, the "Americanists," over-esti-
mates the significance of the specific institutional devices of the 1789
Constitution and espouses reforms that are too superficial.
IV. TiH CONTEMPORARY DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. Introduction
So far we have had little to say about constitutionalism as a concise
body of doctrines. One reason is that the term itself is of relatively
recent usage; the doctrines associated with it do not acquire precision
until we are well into the 20th century.
A constitution, at Roman law, was merely an enactment by the
Emperor. That usage was consistent with the etymology of the word-
to make, set up, or put in place-and also with the meaning it had dur-
ing the Middle Ages, as for example in the Constitutions of Clarendon
of 1164,69 drawn up during the reign of Henry II to define the limits
of civil ecclesiastical jurisdiction. With minor exceptions, 70 the term
did not, until the 17th century, convey the idea of the fundamental
frame of government, for the primary meaning of constitution referred
to man-made positive, rather than declarative, law. Hence, after the
15th century, as man-made plans of church and civil government be-
gan to appear, it was appropriate to refer to them as constitutions, and
69. C. McILwAIm, CONsIT[ONALISM, ANcIENT ANm MODERN 23 (1947) [hereinafter
cited as CONSTm-rJONALISMl.
70. Id. at 25.
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only after that could the term constitution come to mean the structural
forms and limits set up by men for government.
Of course one did not create constitutions out of nothing nor from
whim. They had to possess validity of some sort and, as we have seen
earlier, this typically derived from a more fundamental law of God,
reason or nature. Hence, constitutional government, a phrase that
appeared in England in the 17th century, referred to both the actual
frame of government and also a mode of conducting government that
would accord with the principles of some fundamental source of validity
lying outside the constitution itself. For some time during the 17th and
18th centuries the principles of kingship announced by the defenders
of the Stuart monarchs stood in opposition to those announced by the
proponents of constitutional government. Each rested its claim to
authority on higher but different sources of validity.7 1 During the 18th
century the authority of kingship was undermined, and the ensuing
regimes were known as constitutional monarchies.
Constitutionalism, which first came into use in the early 19th century,
was initially a term of opprobrium. In 1832, Robert Southey, then Eng-
land's poet laureate, used it in disparagement of the radical reformers of
his times. Gradually constitutionalism came to refer to the principles
underlying that form of state in which kingship had been rendered sub-
ordinate to either constitutional principles, or, in some cases, to an actual
written constitution. Republican regimes, most prominently those of
America and France, originally resulted from the application of the prin-
ciples of constitutional monarchy to a regime with an elected executive
standing in place of a king.72 Although this substitution soon produced a
new stage of constitutional thought, its assimilation took several decades.
Mosca, writing well into the 20th century, underscored the traditional
meaning by distinguishing between constitutional and parliamentary
government. ' 3  The term constitutional was restricted to constitutional
monarchy. Mosca's distinction was between governments in which the
executive ministers did not resign when they were defeated in the legis-
lature, but only through the action of the head of state (constitutional),
71. Frances Bacon was an exception, Wheeler, The Constitutional Ideas of Francis
Bacon, 9 W. Political Q. 927 (1956), as was James I on occasion, CONSTrrUTIONALISM,
supra note 69, at 13.
72. Marshal MacMahon, on accepting the Presidency of France, made it clear that
he regarded the Constitution of the French Third Republic as prolegomena to the resto-
ration of a constitutional monarchy; Maitland referred to "those kingless monarchies on
the other side of the Atlantic."
73. MoscA, supra note 6, at 261.
[Vol. 8
1975] THE FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 557
and those in which the ministers were appointed by the head of state
but had to resign whenever they lost their majority in the legislature
(parliamentary). He described America as a "presidential" form of
government and appeared to classify it by analogy along with constitu-
tional monarchies rather than with parliamentary governments.74
Mosca argued that in parliamentary regimes specific constitutional safe-
guards might be eliminated while in constitutional monarchies, preser-
vation of the King required preservation of the chartered limitations of
his authority and also of constitutionalism. Hence, constitutionalism
might be sacrificed if royal authority was completely eliminated. Per-
haps he was reflecting the view of Sir Roger Twysden who, in the 17th
century, wrote, "'The world, now above 5,500 years old, hath found
means to limit kings, but never yet any republique.' ,,75 What Mosca
called the "liberal" state came closest to the contemporary meaning of
constitutionalism .7
The pivotal figure for 20th century doctrines of constitutionalism is
Otto Gierke,77 the great historian of medieval Natural Law doctrines.
Gierke flourished during the latter half of the 19th century. Romanti-
cism was at its apex. Sociology-and socialism-were brash and lusty.
Democracy was overtaking both constitutional monarchism and republi-
canism. Nationalism and imperialism were triumphant. Industrializa-
tion had grown into an institutional juggernaut. Science, as well as the
fine arts, was laying foundations for spectacular achievements. And
with all this came a magnificent explosion of historical scholarship with-
out equal either before or after. Some of the most spectacular achieve-
ments were in medieval history, and in England, at least, one result
was, in effect, a second "reception" of the Roman law. Savigny's
history of Roman law78 had paved the way. Sir Paul Vinogradoff's
legal histories79 later helped bring this home to a wider English
audience, but it struck with special force because of the earlier work
of Otto Gierke, whose Das Deutsche Genessenschaftsrecht was pub-
lished in 1881. Gierke's work had an enormous effect on a brilliant
group of English medievalists, the most prominent of whom was F. W.
Maitland. In 1900, he had published an English translation of part of
74. Id. at 262-63.
75. Quoted in CONSrrruTioNALISM, supra note 69, at 138 (footnote omitted).
76. MoscA, supra note 6, at 409-10.
77. Gimux, supra note 44.
78. R. SAVIGrNY, GESCMCHTE DEs R6MISCHEN REcirs im MrrrLEALrER (1815-1831).
79. P. VniOGRADOFF, VILLAINAGE IN ENGLAND (1892); P. VINOGRADOFF, ROM LAw
IN MODERN EUROPE (1909).
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the third volume of Gierke's work under the title Political Theories of
the Middle Age.
Maitland, though he never wrote explicitly about constitutionalism,
was impatient equally with the narrow legalism that led from Bishop
William Stubbs (whom he admired) to John Austin, and with the politi-
cal empiricism which led from Hallam (the first to employ the term
constitutional history) to Samuel Rawson Gardiner. Maitland's own re-
searches had led him to plumb the mysteries of such things as the "Cor-
porate Sole" and "The Crown as a Corporation."'8  However, Mait-
land's underlying concern with corporate institutions was motivated by
an interest in what we now call constitutionalism. He believed, from
historical research as well as constitutional conviction, that the Roman
law "concession" theory of the authority of the corporation was wrong.
This doctrine held that the corporation was a legal fiction and existed
only by virtue of its legal creation by the state. The concession theory
portrayed the corporation as an artificial contractual association rather
than a natural, self-validating fellowship. Only the latter doctrine, in
Maitland's view, furnished an autonomous foundation for the liberties,
franchises and rights necessary to safeguard self-government. Gierke,
employing the distinction between fellowship (gesellschaft) and asso-
ciation (gemeinschaft), had argued that while an association could
result from a legal and contractual relationship between individuals, a
proper self-validating fellowship, tracing to Germanic rather than
Roman institutions, was a "real" collective person s1 Gierke developed
the theory of the real personality of the group, an organismic idea that
accorded both with Maitland's own constitutional convictions as well as
with what he was discovering about English medieval institutions,
especially the corporate form known as the trust.82 Following Gierke
part way, Maitland argued that groups could be self-validating and were
almost as real as a human being. Gierke provided him with a theoreti-
cal basis for the group realism he felt essential to constitutional theory.
Constitutionalism, the idea as well as the term, was central to
Gierke's work. He was at pains to discredit the positive law associa-
tionist theory of the modern state, chief responsibility for which he
visited upon Thomas Hobbes, and to resurrect a fellowship principle
80. 3 THE COLLEcTED PAPERs oF FREDEuc WiLuAM MAnrLAND 244-70 (H. Fisher
ed. 1911).
81. GmRKE, supra note 44, at 81-82.
82. J. CAMERON, FREDERICK WLLum MAmAN AND Tm HIsTORY or ENGLISH LAw
(1961); Stoljar, The Corporate Theories of Frederick William Maitland, in LEGAL PER.
SONALnTY AND PoLrIcAL PLRALISM 20-44 (L. Webb ed. 1958).
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of constitutionalism whose validity could be given a foundation inde-
pendent of the authority of the state. Searching back through the then
obscure doctrines of the medieval jurists, he discovered that they had
developed a dualistic theory of the state that Gierke christened
"Double Majesty."8' 3 This was the doctrine that people, as an organic
entity, had always, during the middle ages, stood over against the
king-an equal, if occasionally ineffective, participant in majesty (not
sovereignty). While the medieval schoolmen had grounded these doc-
trines on Natural Law, Gierke saw behind that conception a lower case,
prescriptive natural law which expressed the same sociological reality
Maitland was to discover at the heart of medieval English institutions.8 4
The explication, in one way or another, of the nature of this abiding
institutional juristic substance, became the quest of the succeeding
theorists of constitutionalism.
J. N. Figgis, Maitland's prize student, desiring to demonstrate an au-
tonomous ground for the authority of the institutional Church, also drew
heavily upon Gierke. Figgis' classic study of medieval constitutionalism
was a description of how its leading doctrines emerged when the
opponents of papal absolutism developed their theories of church
government during the 15th century Conciliar Controversy. 5 Several
of Figgis' contemporaries in England found his analysis applicable to
other groups besides the Church. 86 This sociological-historical impulse
stimulated the thinking that led to the great upwelling of constitutional
theory that appeared in England after the 1920's. Figgis argued that
the Church was not subject to domination by the state; the socialist
intellectuals wanted to do the same thing for labour unions and other
indigenous collectivities. In their hands the semi-sociological juristic
strand of political philosophy drawn from T. H. Green's ethical
philosophy of the state 7 was to issue in the theories of guild socialism
that acquired vogue in England prior to the rise of fascism.
B. The Positive State in England and America
The practical aspects of this problem had come to a head over the
83. Gimcax, supra note 44, at 54-55.
84. Of course, Edmund Burke had previously written of England's "prescriptive" con-
stitution, but Burke's Natural Law conception stands out in stark isolation in the late
18th century parliamentary debates. Reform of Representation in the House of Com-
mons, in 6 WoRKs 146 (1861).
85. J. FI GIs, STUDmiS OF POLnCAL THOUGHT FROM GERsoN TO GROTIUS, 1414-1625,
at 41-61 (1923).
86. See, e.g., G. COLE, GUILD SOcIALISM (1920).
87. T. GRFEN, LECTuRES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION (1895).
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advent of what by then had come to be called the positive, social wel-
fare state. Its proponents were confronted with the necessity of accom-
plishing a delicate theoretical maneuver. The hallowed English consti-
tutional tradition of the negative state that stemmed from Locke, and
later the utilitarians, had been individualistic, positivistic, economistic
(if not materialistic) and somewhat anarchistic. As a result, the
accepted theory of English constitutionalism seemed to be totally
incompatible with the positive state required to institute collectivism.
Modem constitutionalism had been born from the struggle against the
Stuart mercantilists, and their doctrines had been in some ways
similar to the collectivist ideas of England's 20th century socialists.
Moreover, the Lockean tradition had been chaperoned through the clos-
ing decades of 19th century by liberal individualists such as Lord Acton"8
and Albert Venn Dicey, 0 who held fast to the central liberal political
dogma of the limited state. They argued that the political core of con-
stitutionalism was to be found in the rule of law restrictions of govern-
mental action. Anything that undermined this central tenet-such as
collectivism, the positive state and even administrative law-was
anathema.
While the reformers acknowledged the crucial importance of the
rule of law, they objected to interpretations that made it appear inimi-
cal to social reform. In the United States, somewhat later, these issues
were fought out before the Supreme Court during the 1920's and 30's.
But this resolution was impossible in England. Anything an English
Parliament might decree was, from a legal standpoint, constitutional,
and no appeal lay to the courts. Hence, English opponents of the new
socialist proposals could not charge that they were unconstitutional at
English law. The absence in England of judicial review of the consti-
tutionality of legislative enactments forced the argument out of the
technical realm of constitutional law and into that of general constitu-
tional theory. This specific characteristic of the English Constitution
ultimately forced both sides of the argument to enunciate the underly-
ing principles of constitutionalism. This lot fell to the contending aca-
demic polemicists of the day, and as a result of their writings constitu-
tionalism became the central concept in political theory for more than
a generation.
The neo-liberal collectivists such as T. H. Green and Maitland coun-
tered the orthodox liberal individualists by reaching beyond Locke
88. 1. AaroN, LEcTREs ON MODERN HISTORY (1907).
89. DicEr, supra note 3.
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and the 17th and 18th century English empiricists into continen-
tal idealism on the one hand and medieval constitutionalism on the
other, attempting thereby to undermine the enormous authority and
prestige of the solid English constitutional tradition upon which the
orthodox liberals drew. Gierke, with his unrelenting attack on individ-
ualism, as well as his doctrine of the reality of the corporate group per-
son, was perfectly suited to their needs. If Gierke had not existed,
Maitland and Figgis would have been hard pressed to invent something
comparable, solely out of indigenous English materials. Gierke per-
mitted the neo-liberal socialists to ignore the august tradition, that
stemmed from Locke and answer -the stand-pat rule of law orthodox lib-
erals by resurrecting a hallowed and immemorially constitutionalist
English law derived from ancient charters and constitutions rather than
17th and 18th century individualists. The rule of law was not ignored,
but its true sources were attributed to English constitutional conven-
tions much more ancient than the Glorious Revolution. These tradi-
tional conventions of the constitution were alleged to be even more
important than the legalistic doctrines of individualist liberalism. They
insured that English government, even should it become socialist,
would continue to observe traditional English rights and liberties.
Hence the reformers concluded that the positive social welfare state
was demonstrably compatible with the deeper .meaning of English con-
stitutionalism.
Ernest Barker,90 also a Maitland disciple, and A.D. Lindsay91
consolidated the tenets of the requisite political theory. Harold Lask 9 2
levelled a devastating attack against orthodox individualistic liberalism.
W. Y. Elliott, writing under a heavy indebtedness to Green and
Lindsay, attempted to Americanize the philosophic side of the argu-
ment, translating the English academic war against empiricism into one
against pragmatism, the American counterpart of which was then,
under John Dewey, running at high tide.93 Elliotts Pragmatic Revolt
in Politics contains more copious references to constitutionalism than
had previously appeared in print anywhere.
However, one result of this Americanization of the English debate
was to impose an "Anglican" version of unwritten, conventional consti-
tutionalism upon the heavily juridical and formalized constitutional
90. E. BmumiR, REFLECTnONS ON GovErNMENT (1942).
91. A. LINDsAy, TnE MoDm DEMacmTc STATE (1947).
92. H. LASKr, A GRmAMMA OF PoLmTcs (1967).
93. W. ELLIOTF, THE PRAGMATIC REVOLT IN POLITICS (1928).
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structures that were so characteristically American; an effectual angli-
cization of American constitutionalism. Of course, an Anglican doc-
trine had a distinguished lineage reaching back through Abbott Law-
rence Lowell and Woodrow Wilson to Hamilton and Washington.
Benjamin F. Wright, Elliott's colleague at Harvard, completed the
Americanizing maneuver. Starting with the early New England divines
and relying heavily upon John Adams, he attempted, with only partial
success, to demonstrate the existence of an ongoing Natural Law theme
lying at the heart of the American constitutional tradition.0 4  C.H.
McIlwain, scion of distinguished Harvard tradition that had long ad-
vocated the adoption in America of a version of England's parliamen-
tary system, was also a medievalist in the Maitland mold. 5 McIlwain
did not publicly enter the debate over constitutionalism until the 1930's.
By that time the appearance of fascism had shifted the argument
over constitutionalism to a new plane. Fascism relied upon organismic
theories of the state, and this fact alone went far toward discrediting
Gierke's theory of the real personality of the group.
[Tihe recent appalling effects of tribal particularism have served to
heighten the suspicion held by some of us a good while before, that after
all the impressive apparatus of Gierke's Genossenschaftsrecht some-
times merely conceals the weakness of some of its principal historical
conclusions instead of really strengthening them. The too ready accept-
ance of these conclusions by F. W. Maitland, the greatest of all our
modem historians of English medieval institutions, unfortunately created
a vogue in England and America for these views which a careful exam-
ination of them seems hardly to justify.90
Early studies of fascism had indicated that in Italy and Germany consti-
tutionalism had been undermined by the creation of a "second state"
that was anti-constitutionalist and which, while leaving the formal struc-
ture of the old state standing, subverted it by creating a second, totali-
tarian regime that, when superimposed upon the old state, was able to
substitute its anti-constitutionalist "people's law" for the traditional
constitutional law, rendering the latter unable to forestall the spread of
Nazi terror.97
Fascism directed the attention of the neo-liberal constitutional
theorists back to the rule of law tradition. The task now was to
94. B. WIoH, A.MERiCAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATIONAL LAw (1931).
95. C. MCILwAwn, supra note 2.
96. CoNSTntrrmONAmusm, supra note 69, at 44; see id. at 91.
97. E. FRAENKEL, THE DuAL STATE (E. Shils, E. Lowenstein & K. Knorr transl.
1941).
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incorporate it into a doctrine of constitutionalism for a positive, social
welfare state freed from organismic foundations without, however,
capitulating to orthodox individualistic rule of law liberalism. There
were two problems. First, to give the strict observance of the rule of
law a more central position than Maitland, Figgis, et. al. had allowed,
without capitulating to the anti-collectivist bias of the powerful juristic
tradition stemming from Locke. Second, however, to lodge its founda-
tions in pre-liberal, pre-individualist English constitutional traditions
without relying upon the noxious doctrines Maitland and his followers
had borrowed from Gierke.
Mclwain's solution was to identify constitutionalism with the higher
law and the vox populi traditions. The latter could then be distinguished
from the noxious volksgeist which had come into such disrepute in Nazi
Germany. In his survey of historical precursors, he ignored Greek
analysis of formal constitutional structures, concentrating instead on
fragmentary statements about the higher law drawn from Plato's
Statesman. McIlwain argued that "modem" constitutionalism had
originated in Rome. But not in the familiar mixed state doctrines of
Polybius and Plutarch; rather, in the stoic doctrines of law found in
Cicero, Seneca and the Institutes of Justinian.
In the final pages of his impressive study McIlwain made his own
stand clear even though he denied that the preceding survey permitted
him to "deduce any strict definition of constitutionalism."9 It turned
out that medieval Englishmen had been on the right track. Medieval
constitutionalism, said McIlwain, rested upon the distinction between
jurisdictio and gubernaculum. Jurisdictio referred to the way in which
official action was performed: the formal procedures of a proper
monarchy. Gubernaculum referred to the substantive aspects of
government in a monarchy. Mcflwain held that this doctrine of medi-
eval kingship is applicable to modem constitutionalism.
The reconciliation of these two remains probably our most serious practi-
cal problem .... There is the same necessity now, as in ages past,
to preserve these two sides of political institutions intact ... and to
guard against the overwhelming of one of them by the other.99
However, modem Englishmen had done better than their medieval
forebearers by two maneuvers. In the first place, they brought the pro-
cedural aspects of gubernaculum under jurisdictio, under, that is, the
rule of law, guaranteed by an independent judiciary. In the second
98. CoNsrrrtrnoNALisM, supra note 69, at 135.
99. Id. at 139.
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place, they lodged the source of the validity of gubernaculum, as well
as control over its substantive actions, in the people acting through dem-
ocratic processes. Mcflwain perceived that the maintenance of consti-
tutionalism requires both that popular institutions, and the rule of law,
be kept vital. But the institutional sources of vitality in which he
trusted were unconvincing: a British-type party system and an inde-
pendent judiciary. Yet that was about the way McIlwain summed it
all up, adding to his imprecations against Gierke the admonition to
avoid a typical American pitfall. Separation of powers and other such
peculiarly American appurtenances of the 1789 Constitution, he
warned, are irrelevant to constitutionalism: "Among all the fallacies
that have obscured the true teachings of constitutional history, few are
worse than the extreme doctrine of the separation of powers and
the indiscriminate use of the phrase 'checks and balances.' "100 The
reason follows from the thesis: such devices do not ensure the main-
tenance of popular controls and they are irrelevant to insuring an inde-
pendent judiciary. Indeed, "the doctrine of the separation of powers,"
MeIlwain pronounced, "has no true application to judicial matters,''
despite the contrary opinions of certain "closet philosophers like Mon-
tesquieu.' ' o
McIlwain performed an astounding tour de force. Laying down
what was to become acclaimed as the bible for all succeeding theo-
rists of constitutionalism, he purported to display the essence of the
topic and did so while scarcely mentioning the classical liberals
such as Locke and Montesquieu and without carrying his essential story
beyond England of 1630. The time honored staples of the constitu-
tional theory of the rule of law, such as the mixed state, separation of
powers and checks and balances dropped completely from sight and
with them any special American (or French) claim to having contri-
buted to modem constitutionalism. The extent to which their polities
partook of the virtues of constitutionalism was measured by their de-
gree of adherence to the formula derived from Gothic England. Any-
thing else was superfluous. The scholarship was impressive and the
style magistral, but the dilemma McIlwain posed was disturbing. Iis
doctrine made the rule of law and the positive state compatible with
modem constitutionalism in England, but nowhere else. It bestowed
laurels upon one or two Romans, a few obscure medieval jurists and
Sir Edward Coke but dismissed cavalierly Aristotle, Polybius, Bacon,
100. Id. at 141.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 142.
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Harrington, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Jefferson, Adams,
Madison, Hamilton and Calhoun. Mcflwain as much as stated that if
the Americans wished to install a positive state and also enjoy the bless-
ings of constitutionalism they would have to forget the structural pre-
occupations of the Founding Fathers and all those features that distin-
guished the American from the English constitutional tradition.
Francis Wormuth set about to redress the imbalance in a brilliant
study which, while not ignoring the medieval materials, reestablished
the more familiar linkages between the rule of law, constitutionalism
and the structuralist tradition which reached from the mixed state of
antiquity to the separation of powers doctrines of modem times. In
order to put these all back together again, it was necessary to resume
the story where McIlwain had left off, namely, with the mid-17th cen-
tury English Civil Wars. That was where most of the specific devices
and ideas that characterize modem constitutionalism found expression
-the written constitution, separation of powers, checks and balances,
bicameralism and judicial review. However, these were not without
their own resonances in ancient and medieval times. So once the an-
cient origins and the 17th century inventions were restored to what
Wormuth believed to be their proper places, it was possible for him
to supply the connective tissue for making a juncture between the gen-
eral theory of constitutionalism and the more special tradition of Amer-
ican constitutionalism.' 0°
The central problem of constitutionalism, said Wormuth, was that
stated by Madison in The Federalist: "'[F]irst enable the government to
control the governed; and in the next place to oblige it to control
itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control
on government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of
auxiliary precautions.' "104 To these auxiliary precautions, Wormuth
continued, "we give the name constitutionalism."'10 5 Hence, one of the
essentials McIlwain relied upon in describing the modernization of
medieval constitutionalism, namely, the bringing of gubernaculum
under popular control, is separated from the more specific architectural
principles that underlie constitutionalism. Two kinds of devices are
concentrated upon. One is the protection of "substantial interests from
governmental encroachment."'010 This referred not only to the protec-
103. WoRMurH, supra note 48, at ix.
104. Id. at 3, quoting, THE FEDER&LisT No. 51, supra note 66, at 348.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 3-4.
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tion of property but also the protection of the civil rights so prominent
in the American view of constitutionalism. This provides the basis for
doctrines of toleration and pluralism that have occupied the attention
of so many American political scientists. 107 Wormuth gave high promi-
nence to the separation of powers and checks and balances so repug-
nant to McIlwain. They helped guarantee the rule of law which Wor-
muth described as the "persistently recurring idea of the character of
law," generality and prospectivity'08 : laws should affect all equally and
they should refer only to the future.
Wormuth's summary was:
If law is to be general and prospective in character, it is improper for
the legislative power to deal with particular cases. The temptation to
improvise a special rule may prove too strong. Likewise, it is improper
for the executive power, which applies rules to individuals, to possess
legislative power, for once again persons may be deprived of the advant-
age of known and settled rules. Among arguments for separating the
legislative and executive functions, these were perhaps the most cogent.
The doctrine of separation of powers was immediately assimilated to
the mixed monarchy, with the king in the role of independent executive;
a second balance, that of legislature against executive, was added to the
conventional balance of king, lords and commons. Here we have most
of the elements of modern constitutional thought.10 9
Wormuth, it is clear, is poles apart from McIlwain. His is a
structuralist analysis of the rule of law. It suggests that constitutional-
ism rests upon certain formal institutional arrangements and procedures
which, if instituted and maintained, can go a long way toward guaran-
teeing the protection of certain crucial interests: the safeguarding of
procedural due process of law, and the guarantee that laws will possess
the proper characteristics. To make his case required going back over
the terrain McIlwain had covered in search of an alternative explana-
tion of the Gothic formula McIlwain had uncovered. Not surprisingly,
he took a second look at Maitland and the feature McIlwain had re-
jected: Gierke's analysis of medieval constitutionalism. Ignoring the
real personalty of the group doctrine that had appealed to the Maitland
school, Wormuth concentrated on Gierke's conception of Double Ma-
jesty, alleging that it furnished the proper interpretive meaning of the
medieval doctrines of kingship McIlwain had studied. Double Majesty
was the proposition that medieval kingship had been dualistic rather
107. D. HANsoN, FROM KNGDOM TO CommoNwALTH 336-73 (1970).
108. WoRMuH, supra note 48, at 4.
109. Id. at 8-9.
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than unitary. Previous theories of constitutionalism, save that of
Gierke himself, had ignored it completely. Double Majesty held that
medieval kings had possessed a sphere of absolute power, but alongside
it was a separate sphere in which they were under the law. During the
17th century stresses between these two partners developed and finally
become intolerable. Toward the end of the century the dualistic medie-
val constitution was overthrown in favor of something more akin to an-
cient conceptions of jurisprudence and mixed monarchy. Here Wormuth
challenged McIlwain directly. In Wormuth's analysis, the dominium
regimen et regale of Fortescue, as well as the other English texts seized
upon by Mcllwain, were all evidences of the medieval Double Majesty
which pertained to kingship, narrowly conceived, rather than to any-
thing compatible with the modem state, and hence could not provide
the foundation for the modem rule of law tradition. Indeed, claimed
Wormuth, that earlier dualism was precisely what was overthrown by
modem constitutionalism, and the crucial maneuver came in the mid-
17th century when "commonwealth," or national civic consciousness
(citizenship), supplanted "kingdom" and personal loyalty to the king
(allegiance).
110
Wormuth's work permitted revalidating the significance for constitu-
tionalism of the governmental schemes of the early 17th century proto-
liberals who had drawn up the Cromwellian constitutions. Especially
prominent in his story is James Harrington, who was so deeply admired
by John Adams, as well as by many other architects of the American
Constitution. But Wormuth's work also resurrected Hobbes, Locke,
Montesquieu and the classical liberals who had labored so arduously
over the structural principles of constitutional government. This was
precisely the tradition that McIlwain, in ignoring it completely, had im-
plicitly discredited.
C. The Contemporary Debate
We cannot avoid seeking for the truth of the matter. It is not merely
a question of resolving the intricate issues of historical interpretation
in dispute in these two doctrines of constitutionalism, though this is
a matter not to be dismissed lightly. The crucial matter is to find out
whether or not there is anything that is distinctive and also valid about
the tradition out of which American approach to constitutionalism de-
veloped. McIlwain and other "Anglicans" say no, and Wormuth and
the "Americans" say yes. This became a pressing contemporary prob-
lem because of the American constitutional crisis that emerged during
110. D. HANSON, FROM KINGDOM TO COMmONWEALTH 30-40 (1970).
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the Nixon administration. For the scholars who offered remedies to
correct those evils found themselves, often unwittingly, coming to op-
position over issues that were contemporary counterparts of the oppos-
ing interpretive traditions represented by Mcflwain and Wormuth. On
the one hand are the "Anglican" constitutional theorists like Samuel
H. Beer. Beer, reasoning as had McIlwain, argued that Americans
should not tamper with the basic governing structure that has evolved
in recent years. Specifically, they should not whittle away at the struc-
ture of the Presidency and should not succumb to the dangerous delu-
sion that somehow Congress can be made to reassert a nostalgically
imagined congressional activism designed to reactivate the separation
of powers mechanism that has fallen out of balance through the growth
of executive power. On the contrary, argued Beer, the contemporary
solution must be sought in the strengthening of the party institutions
permitting the resurgence of the political side of the dualistic balance
between people and government;"1 a view in harmony with the way
McIlwain had modernized Gothic jurisdicto and gubernaculum.
On the other hand were the "Americanists" like Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr.," 2 and Arthur S. Miller,"3 who concentrated upon the structural im-
balances that have grown up between Congress and the Presidency.
They advocated rearrangements capable of mediating between the two.
Of course, numerous other structural innovations, usually designed to
strengthen Congress, became the common currency of the debate
unleashed by Watergate. However, it is apparent that the issue cannot
be resolved until we settle upon a sound theory of constitutionalism.
Suppose we restate the issue. On the one hand, constitutionalism
is viewed in the context of an on-going dialectic between people and
power. The substance of power is controlled by democratic institu-
tions; the forms of the exercise are controlled by an independent
judiciary. According to this view, the problem of constitutionalism is
to facilitate the expression of popular will through electoral institutions
so that government will always operate in the public interest; the main-
tenance of an independent judiciary will force government to function
in accord with the precepts of the rule of law.
Such, at least, is how I interpret Mcflwain's formula. But his modern
English application of the doctrine appears to founder on the same dif-
111. Beer, Government and Politics: An Imbalance, 7 THE CENTER MAO., Mar.-Apr.,
1974, at 10.
112. A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
113. Miller, Separation of Powers: An Ancient Doctrine Under Modern Challenge, 7
THE CENTER MAG., Mar.-Apr., 1974.
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ficulty that had flawed its medieval predecessor: What force would
make the system operate according to the formula? What makes it
proof against Harrington's claim that it is a form of gunpowder rather
than government? This is the way it has turned out in fact in most
modem constitutional democracies. In discussing this problem under
the conditions of the 14th century McIlwain had insisted that medieval
English kings were "absolute without being arbitrary." But the force
that kept them from being absolute eluded his rationalist approach.
The barons, exercising a direct form of civil disobedience, acted as a
regulative force from time to time. Runneymede was the celebrated
example. However, the barons were no more governed by a built-in
constitutional morality than were the kings. At one point McIlwain
hinted obscurely at some yet to be uncovered coronation oath
that would somehow validate his thesis. Yet, as we have seen earlier,
his reference to civil disobedience was a pregnant one; at various places
he opined that constitutionalism was little more than the "institutionali-
zation of civil disobedience." This aspect of constitutionalism has been
given scant consideration in comparison to the attention that has been
lavished upon the rule of law. Usually, refuge is taken in the modem
political party. The preferred example is the English system of pro-
grammatic parties as they functioned prior to the English cabinet crisis
of 1931.114 However, with party systems now in disarray everywhere,
including England, this aspect of constitutionalism requires renewed
emphasis.
Consider again Mcflwain's statement of the modem formula, which
on one side rested upon an independent judiciary. It is true in prin-
ciple that an independent judiciary might be capable of subjecting is-
sues arising from the exercise of governmental authority to the rule of
law. But it would have to want to do so, and some outside force would
have to preserve its jurisdiction. Corruption could confound the first,
and measures like those that Hitler adopted for his terroristic people's
courts could undermine the area in which the rule of law applied. It
is by no means a fail-safe formula, and this in part accounts for the
recurrent effort others have made to identify constitutionalism with a
special regulative architecture of governmental functions as exempli-
fied in the American Constitution. These theorists continue the argu-
ment from the point where McIlwain left off.
Popular institutions plus an independent judiciary are necessary but
not sufficient. They were essential to the creation of the modem state;
114. H. WHEELER, THE CONSERVATIVE CRISiS, ENGLAND'S IMPASSE OF 1931 (1956).
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but something more than these is required to tame it. Moreover, it
is incompatible with the requirements of constitutionalism to leave the
people and the government standing side by side, as had been the case
prior to the introduction of constitutions with formal mechanisms to con-
trol the exercise of governmental authority.
Such a dualism takes us no further than medieval Double Majesty.
Gierke pointed out that it was the inability to resolve this dualism that
had confounded medieval constitutionalism. That was the problem
both Locke and Rousseau attempted to resolve through their different
versions of contract theory. But the true foundation, they insisted, lay
in the right to revolt, and nobody succeeded in incorporating revolution
into constitutionalism. The solution lies with the lead explored earlier:
the institutionalization of civil disobedience. Its indispensability was
reinforced by the lessons of Watergate.
V. THE REINSTATEMENT OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
A. Introduction
As the Watergate crisis came to a head, it became apparent that
many of the worst constitutional abuses of the Nixon Administration
were motivated by a fear of the protest movements of the late 1960's.
In this context Ehrlichman and others appealed to the doctrine of
national security and claimed that it justified all the constitutional
improprieties that had occurred: the Huston plan for instituting a presi-
dential secret police, the Ellsburg break-in, Watergate itself and the
attempt to provide it with a C.I.A. cover, and the extensive C.I.A. sur-
veillance violations of individual privacy."' The leaders of the Nixon
Administration testified that they regarded the protest movement as a
threat to national security with links to the nation's foreign ideological
enemies. While there was no evidence of traitorous conspiracy, some
of the protests were violent and the excesses of these few tended to
discredit all protests and demonstrations, most of which were quite
peaceable applications of civil disobedience.
Mass civil disobedience, understandably enough, is rather frighten-
ing. It calls to mind riots and mobs, and these, like fire storms, strike
terror into the soul. Yet, as we have seen, civil disobedience also pos-
sesses a hallowed status in political history. Magna Carta and the Dec-
laration of Independence are ready examples. Both, however, were
115. See C. BERNSIEN & B. WOODWARD, ALL THi PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974).
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masterminded by men who were rich and powerful, and this fact tends
to make such protests more acceptable, at least in retrospect, than simi-
lar actions taken in the present by poor people. However, in principle,
there should be no difference at all, for the two component parts of
constitutionalism, the rule of law and democracy, often appear to be
incompatible partners; popular demands sometimes conflict with rule
of law procedures. Our apprehensiveness is not lessened merely be-
cause McIlwain has left us with a handy dictum.
Civil disobedience implies that the people must have the capability
of deposing a government they regard as noxious. Constitutionalism
implies that the capability for doing so must be institutionalized and
protected. Under the British Constitution, this was translated into the
party-based capability of triggering a cabinet crisis and dismissing the
government of the day. Hence the conclusion that British parliamen-
tary constitutionalism rests in part upon the ability to force a crisis upon
an errant government and then resolve it through a resort to popular
processes. However, this ability to produce and resolve administration
crises, so prominent in the best of Europe's parliamentary democracies,
was never incorporated into the American "presidential" form of con-
stitutional democracy. This was the feature of the Watergate crisis that
so perplexed Europeans. How could an administration that committed
so grave a crime be permitted to stay in office, they asked? But in
the United States, administrations can be deposed only at quadrennial
intervals, regardless of the fact that an administration, such as that of
Richard Nixon, may be found deficient at the start of its term.
This underscores the fact that although European constitutional tradi-
tions center around institutionalized methods for bringing about and
resolving governmental crises, no such capability exists in the United
States, and this is the greatest structural defect of our present constitu-
tion. Initially, as Hamilton, Madison, Jefferson, and Calhoun pointed
out, our form of federalism, and the concomitant exercise of States'
Rights, offered some possibility confronting the central administration
with a crisis. "The true barriers [defenses] of our liberty in this coun-
try," Jefferson wrote in 1811,
are the State governments; and the wisest conservative power [of
liberty] ever contrived by man, is that of which our Revolution and
present government found us possessed. Seventeen distinct States,
amalgamated, regularly organized . . . [by] the choice of a free people,
and enlightened by a free press, can never be so fascinated by the arts
of one man, as to submit voluntarily to his usurpation. Nor can they
be constrained to it by any force he can possess. While that may
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paralyze the single State in which it happens to be exampled, sixteen
others . . . rise up on every side ready organized for deliberation
by a constitutional legislature, and for action by their governor, con-
stitutionally the commander of the militia of the State." 06
He recognized that this doctrine courted "scission." And while this
was strong medicine, it was also the cure of hardy patriots: "[C]ertain
States might attempt to secede from the Union. This is certainly pos-
sible, and would be befriended by this kind of regular organization
[i.e., federalism]. But . . . if they should ever reach the majority of
States they would then become the regular government. .. .
Jefferson argued that it was the absence of this kind of federalism
in post-revolutionary France that explained its progression toward cen-
tralized dictatorship and terror: "The republican government of
France was lost without a struggle because the party of 'un et indi-
visible' had prevailed; no provincial organizations [read state sov-
ereignty] existed to which the people might rally under authority of
the laws. '" 8  However, in America that form of institutionalized civil
disobedience was eliminated following the Civil War. Watergate re-
vealed that there is a pressing need for us to find an alternative way
to force and resolve administration crises.
It may be replied that Nixon ultimately was forced out of office, and
that is true. But the strenuous and prolonged national trauma that was
required to bring this about underscores the European query. In
Europe the deposition of a government grew out of early impeachment
practices. In the American constitutional setting, however, impeach-
ment is a terminal affliction rather than a ready remedy. To have
applied it to President Nixon would have threatened to destroy rather
than vitalize the constitutional system. In the end, its probable side
effects prevented its utilization. The degree of constitutional catas-
trophe that the resort to impeachment threatened to unleash was
sufficient to render it unavailable. Moreover, but for the quirk of per-
sonality that led Richard Nixon to institute his secret tape recordings,
doubtless he would have weathered the storm that gathered about him-
self. Even then, other fortuitous accidents were also required: that
particular Judge Sirica rather than some other; Woodward and Bern-
stein at that particular newspaper, happening onto the particular "Deep
116. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Monsieur Destutt De Tracy, Jan. 26, 1811, in
13 Tim WhrrINGS OF THOMAS JErFERSON 19 (A. Libscomb ed. 1905) [hereinafter cited
as JEFFERSON, WRIINGs].
117. Id. at 20-21.
118. Id. at 20.
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Throat" who provided them with critical leaks at critical junctures.
With such accidents necessary to even bring the impeachment crisis to
a head, and then to find it too constitutionally disruptive to apply, does
not testify very effectively to the health of the institutionalization of civil
disobedience in contemporary American constitutionalism. However,
in the beginning-in 1789, that is-things were different.
The designers of the 1789 Constitution were talented, almost to a
man, but they were also lucky, and this is not always given its proper
due. They were not working from scratch, and they were not spinning
gossamer institutions out of airy theories. They were essentially writ-
ing into fundamental law functional principles derived from the British
constitutional tradition after making corrections for abuses here and
there. They substituted republican for monarchial authority; they
invented federalism, ostensibly to supplant the unifying authority of the
imperial crown and then added quickly the judicial review they had
pled for when oppressed by what James Wilson earlier called "unconsti-
tutional" parliamentary decrees. There was more to the story: how
they converted British parliamentary supremacy into the separation of
powers checks and balances principles. But even here, though the doc-
trinal steps in the process are intricate to unravel, the resulting
mechanism fell out quite naturally from the effort to republicanize the
concentrated imperial authority of the sovereign British King-in-Parlia-
ment. The balances of powers checks and balances conversion was an
enormously successful tour de force, but the maneuver was not cost
free. What was sacrificed, along with ministerial responsibility to
Parliament, was the ready ability to dislodge a corrupt, incompetent or
unpopular administration. For one constitutional lesson from the
Nixon administration is that impeachment is at once so complex and
so grave, as to virtually foreclose its availability for anything less than
a catastrophic crisis. But a government unable to make emergency
alterations short of a catastrophe is, in a sense, dependent upon catas-
trophe-or revolution-for meeting extraordinary crises. This is the
essential structural weakness of the 1789 Constitution. It assumes, in
effect, that governmental crises will cooperatively arrange their appear-
ances so as to coincide with the preordained quadrennial periodicity of
national presidential elections. This was a fateful error, but it was not
an oversight. The founders thought federalism would solve the prob-
lem.
The result was to deprive the Constitution of its built-in basis for
the development of a republican analogue of what later in Europe be-
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came the cabinet crisis. Sir Robert Twysden " and Gaetano Mosca' 20
had hit upon an important point of constitutional wisdom. For aside
from the American Constitution in the era reaching from Jefferson to
Lincoln-and Switzerland, perhaps-no republic has yet discovered a
surrogate for the ministerial crisis that developed out of European con-
stitutional monarchies. There is a neat piece of constitutional logic in-
volved in this issue and it dates back to Locke and Rousseau, and other
such constitutional engineers so disdained by Charles McIlwain.
Locke's two contracts defused the gunpowder in medieval Double Maj-
esty by establishing first the priority of the social contract and then
a subsidiary contract of government that could be abrogated from time
to time through ministerial crises without rupturing the complete fabric
of society. However, modem republican regimes have failed to ob-
serve the imperatives contained in this architectonic idea. They have
produced instead kingless versions of medieval Double Majesty: de-
royalized replicas of regimen politicum et regale;21 republicanized
gunpowder, and nearly all of them have already blown apart.
In England, the responsibility of the cabinet to parliament was not
established until midway through the 19th century. In America the
Jeffersonian republicans devised a solution appropriate for a republic
that was also a federation. This led to the characteristic feature of Jef-
fersonian constitutionalism.12 2  Jefferson feared the young republic
was being transformed into a dictatorship by the "monocrats." At that
time the distinction between a constitutional republic and a dictatorial
one had not yet been developed. In Jefferson's view that distinction
had to be founded upon the preservation of institutionalized capacities
for exercising effective civil disobedience that could force an errant
administration to its knees through the actions of an aroused populace.
The states, he held, were the vehicles of popular remonstrances against
elitist dictators like Hamilton and also the stabilizing guarantors against
the excesses of French style terroristic dictatorial demogogues like
Marat.
The Alien and Sedition acts brought these isuses to a head. The
Jefferson-inspired Kentucky and Virginia resolutions answered the
Hamiltonian threat in precisely the above terms. The states, read the
Kentucky resolution, had
119. See note 75 supra, and accompanying text.
120. See MoscA, supra note 6.
121. CONSTrrtIrONALYSm, supra note 69, at 87.
122. Jefferson to Eldridge Gerry, Jan. 26, 1799, 10 JEFFERSON, WRMNcas, supra note
116, at 76-79.
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by compact under the style and title of a Constitution for the United
States and of amendments thereto ... constituted a General Govern-
ment for special purposes, delegated to that Government certain definite
powers, reserving each State to itself, the residuary mass of right to
their own self-government; and that whensoever the General Govern-
ment assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthorized, void and
of no force .. 123
Ante bellum republicanism held the Preamble to the Constitution to
read: "We, the people of the States, United. . ....
This was the doctrine over which Jefferson waged the election of
1800. Popular ratification gave him the victory that he celebrated as
the "political revolution of 1800.'124 Its claim to the status of a revolu-
tion rested upon the fact that it guaranteed that the United States gov-
ernment would operate as a constitutional instead of a dictatorial re-
public, and Jefferson, with good reason, regarded this as an historical
first of great moment. The election insured this by confirming the
states as the repositories of institutionalized civil disobedience. So they
remained for over half a century until the legacy of Reconstruction was
to make Richard Nixon the remote beneficiary of the humanitarian stand
taken by the Great Emancipator; the re-feudalized Constitution insti-
tuted by the Radical Republicans issued ultimately in the Watergate
crisis. For the constitutional issues brought to a head as a result of
the excesses of the Nixon administration are direct counterparts of
those that characterized the constitutional crisis that arose as a result
of the machinations of Inspector General Hamilton.
Today we think of federalism only as an archaic device for dis-
tributing authority between the general government and the States.
Initially, however, it provided for a large measure of State autonomy.
The States, as organized political communities, stood between the
general government and the citizen. On the one hand they could oper-
ate as a negative check to protect citizens from arbitrary actions by the
general government; on the other hand they could be a positive agency
for the expression of mobilized citizen power: hence the justification
for describing federalism as one way in which civil disobedience was
institutionalized in the early republic.
Jefferson casually assumed that Americans were just naturally the sort
of liberty loving creatures who would pull off a revolution every gen-
eration or so. Jackson, Calhoun and all patriots up to the end of the
123. SISSON, supra note 68, at 293-94.
124. See H. WHEELER, THE CONSERVATIVE CmsIS 111-19 (1971); SISsoN, supra note
68, at 343.
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Civil War made the same assumption, and they were right until Gettys-
burg. For the Civil War ended more than confederate state sov-
ereignty. It also dampened the congenital American impulse to rebel-
lion and stilled the civil disobedience safety valve our Founding Fathers
had not otherwise written into the Constutition. The imperative need
for unity at all costs, and the centralizing arrangement that served this
need, deprived the Constitution and its adherents of the leverage the
Jeffersonian Republicans thought they had deposited for all times in
the hands of the people. America has never really recovered from the
Civil War, and there were many aspects of it she very well should not
recover from. But she also, in shedding the bad, sacrificed along the
way her chief built-in provision for the constitutionalization of civil dis-
obedience. If Watergate, in its deeper meaning, teaches us no more
than the need to reconstitutionalize an appropriate contemporary form
of civil disobedience, it will have been a felix culpa; a fortunate fall,
for the conclusion that follows from the foregoing analysis is that civil
disobedience is the father, not the ward, of civil liberty; it is prior to
rather than derivative from first amendment freedoms.
After the Civil War federalism ceased to operate as a device permit-
ting the states to check the federal government as a whole. Long be-
fore Watergate the separation of powers had succumbed to the engross-
ment of authority by the presidency. By the 1950's the two party
system had hardened against popular dissent and rendered virtually
impossible a repetition of the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian protests that
had led to the modem political party. The media of communications,
taken overall, functioned in support of the government rather than as
the vigilent voice of conscience which initially had entitled them to their
chartered liberties. The result was to undermine the autonomies of
previously independent centers of authority. The federal government,
under the hegemony of the presidency, acquired a monopoly of power.
The Supreme Court, subject to indirect influence through presidential
appointments, was an unreliable protector of civil disobedience.
As we have seen, although British constitutionalism derived from im-
peachment proceedings, in the United States the impeachment process
failed to issue in an institutionalized method for dealing with crisis; our
own form of constitutionalism remains dependent upon more primitive
forms of civil disobedience.
B. The Constitutional Theory of Civil Disobedience
There is a basis in American constitutional theory for remedying this
defect. Indeed, protection for civil disobedience is not only required
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by the principles underlying the first amendment, but also rests upon
at least as solid constitutional grounds as does the practice of judicial
review. Indeed, the protection of civil disobedience is essential to the
maintenance of an evolving constitutional order whose emerged prin-
ciples are developed through the interpretations of a Supreme Court.
This, of course, is the issue that arose in Weimar Germany, and ever
since we have pondered the proper antidote should a threat similar to
that posed by Hitler again arise. Many Americans believe the
nation is now threatened with a neofascist subversion of the prin-
ciples of the Constitution and that this can be forestalled only through
determined acts of civil disobedience.
In the 1960's Francis Wormuth demonstrated that President John-
son's waging of the Vietnam war was an usurpation of authority in vio-
lation of the Constitution.' 25 Frank Harvey showed that the Vietnam
war was waged in violation of the Nuremberg prohibitions of crimes
against humanity.'2 Paul Jacobs depicted-if more than the morning
newspapers were needed-the extent to which the cities have decided
to "solve' the problems of their ghettos by storm troop methods. 27
The radicals and activists of the 1960's did not, before storming into
the streets, sit down first and ponder the principles of constitutional
theory, although the numerous campus "teach-ins" did emphasize the
constitutional issues involved. The radicals resorted to direct action in
their opposition to official immorality and invoked in their self-defense
a higher constitutional morality. The civil disobedience of those days
was consistent with the principles that had been at issue for over five
hundred years in history's greatest constitutional struggles. However,
it must be borne in mind that the American Constitution was drafted
prior to the advent of democracy. It institutionalized forms of civil dis-
obedience that had been pioneered by social elites but not those of the
people. This task of bringing constitutionalism abreast with the
historical achievement of popular democracy still remains to be ac-
complished. Its urgency was demonstrated by Watergate and the
national security basis for repressing popular demonstrations it exposed.
It does not suffice to argue that the Supreme Court has in the past up-
125. Wormuth, The Vietnam War: The President Versus the Constitution, Center for
the Study of Democratic Institutions, (Center Occasional Paper, vol. 1 No. 3, 1968).
126. Harvey, Air War in Vietnam 79 FLYING 38 (Nov. 1966).
127. Jacobs, The Los Angeles Police: A Critique, 227 AT-ANTic MoNTereY 95-101
(Dec. 1966). See also P. JAcoDs, PE LUDE TO RIOT: A VIew op URBAN AMERCA
FROM THE BoTroM (1966).
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held the constitutionality of many mass demonstrations for a differently
constituted Court could rule the other way.
What is the remedy when the official political institutions as a whole
operate despotically? The Constitution's built-in devices for checking
tyranny fail to function, the individual citizen is left without a champion,
and issues come to depend upon individual acts of resistance. But
under what principle can the needed-the constitutionally required-
acts of individual civil disobedience be defended? It is clear that the
theory of constitutionalism suppoits and defends civil disobedience-
there would be no such thing as constitutionalism without it.12 But
does it follow that mass civil disobedience is protected by constitutional
law?
Reason dictates that anything required in constitutional theory ought
to find recognition in constitutional law. But if that is the case, how
could one state the principle of constitutional law protecting civil dis-
obedience? In the first place, according to the theory of constitutional-
ism, all acts of civil disobedience should have an a priori claim to pro-
tection under the first amendment. Beyond this, however, the primacy
of the principle of civil disobedience derives from the same doctrine
that underlies the exercise of judicial review.
It is established that any individual who believes an ordinance or a
law to be unjustified may break it deliberately for the purpose of testing
its validity. This commonly happens in tax cases. However, this kind
of civil disobedience is really little more than an acceptable legal tactic
rather than a positively protected constitutional right of civil disobedi-
ence because the person who adopts such a tactic must pay the penalty
for breaking the law in the event his challenge is not upheld by the
courts. But what is the constitutional theory upon which such a tactic
is based?
Let us take a different type of case involving a restaurant sit-in to
enforce the right of Negroes to be served in public places. Those mak-
ing the challenge know that the discriminatory restaurant practices are
legalized by local ordinances. This means that a sit-in violates local
trespass laws. The prohibition of trespass is not unconstitutional and
therefore civil disobedience involving trespass is not as such protected
by the Constitution unless it can be validated by reference to a higher
principle of constitutional law. So, at the time of their civil disobedi-
ence the demonstrators know their acts are technically punishable even
128. See pts. I & III supra.
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though they calculate and hope that the courts will later rule in their
favor. But how can the courts do so? The law is settled. The Consti-
tution is known. It was in operation before the demonstrators engaged
in civil disobedience and under the Constitution they merit punishment
for trespass. So how can they possibly expect to win their case?
The answer is that they know, and everyone knows, that in theory
the Constitution is not settled and static. Rather, it is an evolving and
emergent Constitution. Only on the basis of this proposition do such
acts of civil disobedience become rational, for any act of civil disobedi-
ence grounded in sound constitutional theory rather than established
constitutional law may later be validated by the courts. That is, the
courts may later discover that the temporal Constitution to the contrary,
the "true" or "emergent' Constitution actually protects behavior pre-
viously punishable at law. It follows in constitutional theory that in
such a case the so-called acts of civil disobedience were never really
unlawful at all. They always should have been constitutionally pro-
tected even though nobody previously knew this to be so. Those civil
disobeyors who made the successful challenge were actually, in theory,
behaving constitutionally all along. Moreover, what is most important,
constitutional theory holds this may have been the case even if the
courts had ruled the other way and upheld the local ordinances and
trespass convictions.
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court cannot deliver advisory opinions
and state in advance how they would rule if a hypothetical case were to
be brought, there is no way for citizens to know in advance which acts
of civil disobedience later will be found to have been legitimate
demands for the enjoyment of constitutionally protected rights. There-
fore it follows in principle that all who engage in such civilly disobedi-
ent challenges of existing law, those who "lose" as well as those who
"win," can be said to be acting under the same general principle of
constitutional theory, namely that their allegiance, like all citizens' al-
legiance, is to the nation's "true' or "emergent" Constitution of the
future as well as to the transitory, fallible constitution of the present.
That is, their allegiance, like that of ante-bellum Americans, is dual.
On one side it is to the temporal, but transitory, Constitution; on the
other side it is to the developing contours of the "higher" law. It is
this latter side of their allegiance that protesters implicitly invoke when
they engage in civil disobedience. And demonstrators are not alone.
All people who live under such a Constitution must be presumed to
acknowledge allegiance to the emergent as well as the temporal Consti-
tution.
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It follows that the constitutional theory that protects the a priori pre-
sumption of the legitimacy of civil disobedience should be accorded ex-
plicit recognition at constitutional law. That is, constitutional pro-
tection for acts of civil disobedience should be extended in prin-
ciple to cover cases that might lose as well as those that might win,
for such protection is essential to the maintenance of the working prin-
ciples of an evolving constitutional order. This is required in theory
in order to maintain the practice whereby the principles of the
emergent constitution are revealed through judicial review. Civil
disobedience, therefore, acquires the presumption of constitutional pro-
tection as a concomitant of the principle of judicial review. It also
follows that teaching and advocating civil disobedience to others is pro-
tected. This is the general statement of the basis for the constitutional
theory of civil disobedience and of the way that general theory might
find recognition as a principle of constitutional law by adding together
(1) the Bill of Rights, (2) judicial review, and (3) the necessary and
proper implications of an emergent Constitution.
But how might one draw the line between protected and unprotected
disobedience? Obviously, not all violations of law can claim protection
under the above civil disobedience rule. One cannot commit murder
or other acts of violence. The first amendment protects "peaceable"
assembly. Here the principles developed under the clear and present
danger test come into play: first amendment freedoms, and hence civil
disobedience, must be upheld unless doing so would present a clear
and present danger to the maintenance of civic order. Moreover, it
seems proper to insist upon premeditation; there should be evidence
of a prior intent to mount a deliberate challenge to a specific govern-
mental law or action. This does not mean all demonstrations and pro-
tests would automatically acquire protection. There should be a direct
relationship between the act engaged in and the law or practice
objected to. Moreover, the action should have the character of a peti-
tion for the redress of wrongs. One cannot halt all the traffic over the
Golden Gate bridge because one disapproves of an unjust war. Here
another established body of precedents comes into play. These are the
cases establishing picketing as free speech. Once picketing was
illegal.:2 When it acquired protection as an exercise of free speech,
certain standards were required. It had to be non-violentY °0 It had
129. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 436 (1970); Heller-
stein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts, 10 N.C.L. REv. 158 (1932).
130. See Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287,
292-95 (1941).
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to have a direct relation to the grievance complained of.' 13 Similar
general principles could apply to the exercise of the constitutional right
to civil disobedience. The right to petition a private party for the
redress of grievances, as in a trespass case, cannot be given firmer pro-
tection than the right to petition one's own government.
Obviously these criteria would be difficult to apply. They would
involve the courts in "balancing" tests and these are less than satisfac-
tory. But if the above argument is sound, these tests should be applied
in the light of the a priori assumption of the constitutionality of civil
disobedience.
How does this improve on the present situation which rests upon the
Court's interpretation of the Bill of Rights? The answer is that it
properly situates the presumption of the constitutionality of civil dis-
obedience. This helps remove a special group of liberties relating to
direct action from dependency upon the fleeting majorities of Supreme
Court justices. The proposition that the explicit acknowledgment that
civil disobedience is of the essence of constitutionalism is derived from
an argument similar to that Jefferson and others made against Hamilton
when he opposed making the Bill of Rights a part of the Constitution.
Hamilton claimed all their provisions were implicit in the way the pro-
visions in the main body of the Constitution were constructed. The
libertarians replied that unless the specific rights were explicitly
included persons other than Hamilton might not realize they were
incorporated implicitly in the body of the Constitution, or that others
might disagree, and if so there would be no recourse. The argument
against Hamilton also applies to the argument today that there should
be explicit acknowledgment of the constitutional right to civil disobedi-
ence.
The primary objection against the foregoing doctrine is that its
observance might undermine law and order and thus destroy the fabric
of society. The imagination conjures up all sorts of nightmarish visions
of widespread civil disorder. People, it is feared, would feel released
from their normal sense of obligation to obey the law. Like children
released from school, they would rush to an orgy of violence. The
specter of anarchy, which preoccupies the conservative as much as does
sex the puritan, seems to place an indelible hex on the idea of consti-
tutional protection for civil disobedience. But such fears have little
substance.
131. See International Bhd. of Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
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In the first place, it is not strict application of the law and fear of
the police that induces public tranquility. Rather, the entire network
of social and cultural mores, more than the formal provisions of the law,
is what constrains most people from deviant behavior. Such forces are
not going to be overruled by the recognition of the constitutional right
to civil disobedience.
The type of person who is so concerned as to make a moral and con-
stitutional stand on any important issue, against the law or against the
mores of the time, is so rare that fear of prospective anarchy deserves
scant credence. Put it another way: if deviant and disobedient
behavior in actual practice were to become as widespread as this con-
stitutionally protected right theoretically might permit it to become-
and thereby truly injure the fabric of society, bringing the maintenance
of law and order to an end-then that would also constitute proof that
the society no longer deserved the support of its people. The free and
protected exercise of the right to civil disobedience would thus furnish
a democracy with the best possible index of the consent of the people
and the maintenance of the principles of justice.
So far so good. There should be an a priori presumption in favor
of the constitutionality of direct action and this is required because of
the indissoluble tie between constitutionalism and civil disobedience.
However, this deals only with legal presumptions and principles of con-
stitutional construction. But it does not go to the heart of the matter
which is the institutionalization of civil disobedience-and beyond that,
institutionalization in such a way as to do for mass democracy what
earlier forms of institutionalized civil disobedience did for oligarchical
republics.
C. Conclusion
The foregoing doctrine could be implemented without institutional
innovation. It stands as a principle of constitutionalism requiring no
more than recognition and enunciation. But however salutary its adop-
tion might be, it fails to institutionalize a ready ability to dislodge a cor-
rupt or discredited administration. While the following recommenda-
tion may not provide this capacity directly it does furnish an autono-
mous power base for the maintenance of an informed and alert electo-
rate: a new kind of institutionalized civil disobedience which could be-
come an effective counter-force against a disreputable administration.
Recall that it was a combination of intensified public information about
Vietnam and concerted mass opposition that forced the retirement of
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Lyndon Johnson. Although this was an ad hoe response that could not
be relied upon to reassert itself automatically as needed in the future,
the institutionalization of similar ad hoc responses led to the ultimate
emergence of the conventions of the British Constitution. A compara-
ble development might grow out of the recent experiences of Ameri-
cans. Two components are involved. The first is educational; the sec-
ond is structural. This was Jefferson's approach to constitutionalism
in a democratic republic and his lead bears following up on today.
Jefferson came to believe that federalism, public education and his
newly invented political party might enable the people to safeguard
their freedoms. In order for the people to possess the authority to con-
trol their government the States had to remain effective. But the two
ingredients of popular control-political power and education-could
only be brought to bear on the national government through the new-
model political party that deposed the Hamiltonians and put Jefferson
in the presidency.
In Jefferson's day a high school level of education was sufficient to
enable the people to detect and understand the critical issues of the
day. In our own day a considerably higher level is required. As many
of our contemporary commentators have pointed out, our chief prob-
lems, are systemic, and their solutions are counter-intuitive and confound
our ordinary understanding. To apply Jefferson's maxim today re-
quires bringing our entire voting age population up to the level of a
college education.
Despite our traditional democratic educational creed we have never
addressed ourselves effectively to the realization of the goal of provid-
ing high cultural status for all adults. To do so will require a major
political and institutional innovation. The most promising answer to
this problem appears to be provided in our new educational cities such
as Reston and MXC, in Minnesota, designed around their educational
institutions.
Let us put the question differently: If we were to seek for new ways
of institutionalizing mass civil disobedience today, what might we do
under present conditions? This is the question that Ralf Dahrendorf
addressed in a different way in the 1974 Reith Lectures.132 He an-
nounced the need for an "agenda for recovering public control and in-
dividual rights from bureaucracies," while preserving the services they
provide. This he identified as "one of the primary tasks of a search
132. Dahrendorf, Justice Without Bondage, 92 THE LisrENE 692-94 (Nov. 28,
1974).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
for a new liberty." Dahrendorf lamented the "alienation of enlighten-
ment," which he attributed to the bureaucratic rigidities of contempo-
rary industrial societies: "The idea that man should participate in the
social, economic and political process as a citizen . . . ," he argued, is
"one of the revolutionary advances of the expanding society." 118 3 Dah-
rendorf, in 1965, had introduced into German politics the proposition
that education is a civil right. He called for "an active policy of full
citizenship. . . . For the new liberty," he claimed, "will not be won
unless every citizen is given access to the varied universe of life-chances
in a complex society."1 4 This, he argued, calls for "the revolt of the
individual against the ossification of reality." This is not a simple task
because representative democracy has compounded the difficulty and
produced "a new authoritarianism in the cloak of participation ...
The equality party has had its day, and the task today is to develop
the full potential of a new liberty."'35 Dahrendorf, confronting con-
temporary centralization, has sounded a Jeffersonian refrain: high ed-
ucational status for the people plus the disaggregation of bureaucratic
power. But how to make this new force politically effective?
Recent years have witnessed a quest for a new form of grass roots
participational democracy; one that would be as applicable to an urban
civilization as were our previous democratic forms to rural conditions:
a new form of participation capable of bringing democracy to our city
streets. The establishment of a priori constitutional protection for civil
disobedience might open the door to a new participational democracy
of the streets, but how would it be institutionalized? Through the es-
tablished party system?
At first, in the early 19th century, there was a possibility that the
newly invented Jeffersonian political party might have provided the
proper foundation. Developments since then have frustrated that
hope. Today, social critics are already writing about the dawn of a
"post-party" form of democracy.
It was in the United States, not Europe, that the modem mass politi-
cal party first appeared. It grew out of the innovations of the Jeffer-
son-Jackson period and the inter-sectional crisis that soon after began
to unfold. Much later the two party system emerged. In the eyes of
many political scientists the two party system was virtually identical with
democracy itself. The later tendency was to visit this intent upon the
133. Id. at 693.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 694.
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Jeffersonians. That was far from what Jefferson had in mind. "Par-
ty," at that time meant a legislative faction and its outside supporters.
The prime example was the English Parliament, and the parliamentary
factional parties of 18th century England was exactly what Jefferson
wished to avoid. He believed instead that the people ought to be the
repositories for the authority to control their government and this might
be accomplished if they could be organized in a non-party political sys-
tem based on the states. Inter-party competition was the thing to be
avoided, not the goal to be sought. Moreover, he was sensible to the
force of our contemporary allegations that representative institutions
produce political alienation by separating the people from the exercise
of power. Hence his concentration upon grass roots democracy. Not
raw mass power but federally institutionalized popular power.
Now we begin to perceive a way of reviving the institutionalized civil
disobedience that died with the atrophy of federalism after the Civil
War.
Federalism has always meant decentralized organization in which the
component units have a territorial base. However, there are other
ways of utilizing the same principle. One is to base organization on
functioning units such as industries and professions, or on policy areas
such as economics or science. Various forms of corporativism have
done this, the most familiar being that now operating in Jugoslavia.
Indeed, something like the Jugoslav scheme may be necessary to bring
stagflation under control for such a device might make it feasible to
organize the economy on a political basis. Representatives of local
economic councils could meet in a national economic parliament where
they would be capable of taking responsibility for allocating capital in-
vestment and insuring the equitable distribution of income shares.
Functional federalism would also make it possible to guarantee the
autonomy of the basic functioning components of the society, giving
them a status consonant with the doctrine of subsidiarity. This is a
principle of decentralization whereby the component parts of an organi-
zation resolve on their own all issues they can; it is something like the
appellate jurisdiction of court systems. Nothing is done at the higher
levels of organization unless absolutely necessary. On such a basis
many of the propositions that John C. Calhoun advocated concerning
territorial federalism could be adapted to functional federalism.
Here we would be thinking of our new cities as functional communi-
ties and "publics"; true community 'republics. Their concerns would
be general rather than limited solely to economic or administrative is-
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sues. This implies that such community Republics, possessing auton-
omy and protected under the constitutional theory of the institutionali-
zation of civil disobedience, could function as the primary building
blocks of a democratic society. The pioneering measures of the new
community republics could then serve as models for the reconstitution
of the older cities. Jeffersonian democracy could acquire renewed
meaning.
How would our present system of competing parties fit into this pro-
posal? Possibly not at all. There would be no more need of compet-
ing parties than there is for the election of vestrymen in a church. How-
ever, it is true that some way of giving a national focus to these com-
munity republics could be needed. This points to a theoretical issue
that arose earlier; the problem that John Locke solved through the de-
vice of two contracts-the prior contract of society and the subordinate
contract of government-and that the infant republic solved through
federalism, so long as it remained constitutionally vital.
The whole point of institutionalizing civil disobedience is to provide
for the primacy of popular forces vis-h-vis the government, should the
latter misbehave: hence the need to derive a national community of
communities out of the component community republics. While com-
peting political parties could be continued for the filling of federal of-
fices they would be unnecessary in the new national community of com-
munities, for it would stand over against the deliberative institutions of
the federal government. The authority for this derives not only from
John Locke but also from the Preamble to the Constitution: "We, the
People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
Defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this
CONSTITUTION for the United States of America."
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